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The Other Half of Regulatory Theory
HANOCH DAGAN & ROY KREITNER
Theories of regulation conceptualize the task of the agencies of the modern
state in terms of the public interest. Regulatory agencies, in this conventional view,
should ensure the efficient allocation of scarce resources and secure distributive
justice and democratic citizenship. Many agencies nicely fit this aggregative mold,
but not all. A significant subset of the regulatory practice—the second half of the
universe of regulation—deals with a different task: delineating the terms of our
interpersonal transactions, forming the infrastructure for our dealings with other
people, both private individuals and firms. This Article focuses on these relational
regulators, which regulatory theory marginalizes or neglects.
Descriptively, we show that many agencies are best understood as devices that
supplement or supplant the role of courts in addressing horizontal, rather than
vertical or aggregative, concerns. In other words, many of the practices and
operational codes and sensibilities of these agencies are best conceptualized as
responses to the horizontal challenges of the creation of the infrastructure for just
interpersonal relations in core social settings, such as the workplace or the market.
Normatively, we argue that the seeming consensus among theorists of both
regulation and private law, in which these tasks belong to judges rather than
administrators, is misguided. In many contexts—increasingly prevalent in
contemporary society—agencies, rather than (or in addition to) courts, may well be
the appropriate institution, or at least an additional institution, for the articulation,
development, and vindication of our interpersonal rights.
The analysis yields the initial steps towards a more complete theory of
relational regulatory agencies that makes sense of their core practices. We
demonstrate the regulatory implications—in both substance and form—of
undertaking the role of establishing and maintaining the infrastructure for just
interpersonal interaction, and we advance a preliminary account of the regulatory
toolkit appropriate to this relational task.
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The Other Half of Regulatory Theory
HANOCH DAGAN & ROY KREITNER *
INTRODUCTION
Regulatory theory suffers from a fundamental misconception at its core.
The misconception lies in an overly narrow idea of the purposes that
regulatory agencies should pursue, and thus a constricted view of the very
rationality of regulation. According to the misconceived but dominant view,
regulatory agencies must advance the public interest which they can and
should see only through aggregates. Attention to the relations among
individuals, or relational justice, is considered beyond their purview. The
corollary of this dominant view is that relational justice among individuals
is a matter for courts, adjudicating traditional private law disputes. The
institutional division of labor implied by such a view may be a convenient
heuristic, but it is a serious mistake for anyone seeking a compelling account
of how many regulatory agencies actually function. It is an even deeper
mistake for a broad account of how law contributes to generating the
infrastructure for just interpersonal interactions in modern states.
Correcting the common misconception requires a multi-level inquiry,
which we pursue in the following pages. The inquiry yields, eventually, an
enriched theory of regulation which recognizes that regulators rightfully
pursue both collective goals and interpersonal justice. It overcomes an
unrealistic vision of the institutional division of labor between courts and
agencies, and it begins to develop the tools for improving regulatory
practice. It points the way towards understanding the creation and
development of the infrastructure for just relationships as a joint venture
between legislatures, agencies, and courts. In particular, it highlights
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elements of the regulatory toolkit for participation in the creation of a just
social infrastructure.
The ground level of our analysis relies primarily on straightforward
empirical observation, and the discrepancy between such observation and
the misconceived view of institutional division of labor. Concretely, this is
simply a matter of searching out the sources of the norms that ground our
routine interactions. Private law entitlements delineate the terms of
interpersonal transactions, forming the infrastructure for our dealings with
other people. Those rights have a range of sources; more specifically, the
entitlements relevant to interpersonal relations comprise norms with
different institutional pedigrees. Some are doctrines familiar from casebooks
in first year private law courses: trespass; nuisance; the duty to pay damages
upon breach, and the limitation of that duty by doctrines of foreseeability
and mitigation; the requirement of returning mistaken payments; etc. Many
more, however, are the products of regulatory agencies: the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) defines the duties of employers
to provide safe workplaces;1 the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB) determines which lending practices are unfair, deceptive, or
abusive;2 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) determines rights and
obligations of collective bargaining;3 the Office of Fair Housing and Equal
Opportunity (FHEO) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) determine prohibitions on discrimination;4 the Agricultural
Marketing Service (AMS) establishes quality grading and a code of fair
business practices, including dispute resolution;5 and the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) sets safety standards and labeling requirements for
food and pharmaceuticals.6
This list is meant to be exhausting, not exhaustive. Examples of
regulatory agencies acting to create or maintain the infrastructure of daily
interaction in market societies are legion—we could not hope to offer a
comprehensive list. We have limited our attention here to major
administrative agencies; the claim of regulatory contribution to the
infrastructure of interpersonal interaction could easily go further. For a
simple example, consider the effect of zoning on both real property
1

See infra text accompanying notes 127–33 (describing OSHA’s feasible risk reduction test).
See infra text accompanying notes 167–70 (describing CFPB’s authority and definition for finding
an act or practice abusive).
3
See infra text accompanying notes 205–07 (describing employees’ right to unionize and bargain
with their employers).
4
See infra text accompanying notes 211–13 (describing the EEOC’s and FHEO’s interpersonal
focus within their respective agencies).
5
See sources cited infra notes 186–87 (discussing horizontally oriented agencies including the
USDA: specifically, the way in which the USDA as an agency takes care to address complaints, and how
the PACA division of the USDA resolved approximately 3500 claims in the past three years).
6
See sources cited infra note 236 (discussing hybrid agencies (the FTC, SEC, and FDA) and their
aggregative and horizontal features).
2
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transactions and, even more straightforwardly, the reciprocal rights and
duties of members of a local community. A similar point can be made, for
example, regarding state housing codes that not only regulate building safety
but set the baseline entitlements tenants have a right to expect when they
rent apartments from landlords.7
In short, the system of entitlements that undergirds interpersonal
transactions is a joint product of traditional common law rules and
agency-developed regulatory norms. Our observation here is not a
discovery, but more of a reminder. Whatever one thinks of its history, this is
relatively obvious as a matter of description: modern market societies
structure the interactions among individuals in thickly populated forests of
legal norms. It is difficult to imagine a modern society without such
infrastructure. And because of how pervasive regulatory norms are in this
infrastructure, it seems to us unwieldy and unproductive to imagine them as
mere appendages to the system of entitlements.
The next level of inquiry moves us from the descriptive to the normative
realm. Some versions of private law theory claim that common law rules
should be the exclusive backdrop for interactions among individuals. Those
views place judges at the center of responsibility for interpersonal justice,
and legislation or regulation on the distant periphery as alien add-ons or
late-coming policy interventions.8 More importantly for our purposes, the
same presupposition underlies the dominant voices in regulatory theory,
which is our focus here. For the most part, regulatory theory views the task
of regulatory agencies as serving a collective, as a collective: they should
ensure the efficient allocation of scarce resources, or secure distributive
justice, democratic citizenship, and the like. Thus, regulators have no
business in securing relational justice; focusing on the horizontal dimension
—the interactions among individuals—would distract them from the big
picture and thus undermine their core responsibility.9
Taken to its logical limits, this view in regulatory theory questions the
very rationality of some core instantiations of regulatory practice. To take
one example that we develop at greater length below, consider OSHA’s
feasible risk reduction requirement, which is expressly based on a direct
relation between particular employers and employees, and explicitly rejects
aggregate cost-benefit analysis. Some theorists take this as evidence that
7
Cf. Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564, 571 (2017) (explaining
the authority of local agencies and the type of functions these agencies have).
8
This conceptualization of the legal terrain is implicit in most private law casebooks as well as in
prominent theoretical accounts that take the category of private law seriously (viz., corrective justice and
civil recourse). See infra text accompanying notes 46–47, 75–92 (discussing the conventional
understanding of the domain of private law and Friedrich Hayek’s critique of the regulatory state).
9
See infra text accompanying notes 20–24 (discussing the conventional, strictly aggregative,
understanding of regulation).
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OSHA’s practice is normatively deficient and even unintelligible.10 Cass
Sunstein, for example, argues that because “one OSHA regulation protects
a large number of lives at relatively low cost, while another regulation
protects a small number of lives at a relatively high cost,” OSHA is probably
unconstitutional.11 When theory is at a loss to explain core features of
practice, it is not necessarily a good sign for theory. In fact, once we develop
a richer theory of the purposes of regulatory agencies and account for their
role in generating an infrastructure for just relations among individuals,
regulatory rationality is rescued, as theory and practice align.
Interestingly, much private law theory and most regulatory theory share
a double mistake. First, they both assume that what they perceive as the core
activity of each sphere (relational entitlements for private law theory;
collective or aggregative conceptions of the public interest for regulatory
theory) exhaust the types of reasoning that should govern these practices.
Second, they both assume that different institutions (judges alone for private
law theorists; regulators alone for regulatory theorists) always work with
wholly different logics and without shared purposes. This conventional
wisdom divides the world much too neatly, and ignores too much necessary
complexity.
We proceed as follows. In Part I, we develop the argument that the
conventional view, in which relational concerns are alien to the mission of
the state’s regulatory apparatus, is misguided. In many contexts—
increasingly prevalent in contemporary society—agencies, rather than (or in
addition to) courts, are appropriate institutions for the articulation,
development, and vindication of our interpersonal rights. Administrative
regulation is often useful and sometimes indispensable for establishing and
maintaining the infrastructure for interpersonal interaction in complex
societies.
This means that our relational infrastructure, often termed private law,
is and should be a product of a joint venture of common law courts and
administrative agencies. To the extent that private law theory tends to be
court-centric, it will not be capacious enough. At the very least, a singular
focus on courts limits the institutional and procedural imagination as to how
law contributes to our interpersonal, horizontal relationships. Releasing
private law theory from this stricture is an important task, but beyond our
current concerns.12 What is important for us here is another detrimental
effect of this mistake. Presupposing that the regulatory apparatus should be
dedicated solely to aggregative tasks impedes the vision of regulatory
10
See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 657,
707, 709 (2010).
11
Cass R. Sunstein, Is OSHA Unconstitutional?, 94 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1410 (2008).
12
See Hanoch Dagan, The Challenges of Private Law, in PRIVATE LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 67,
82–84 (Kit Barker et al. eds., 2016) (introducing the challenge of incorporating regulatory means into
private law).
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theory, causing it to miss the potential that agencies wield in the
interpersonal realm.
In Part II, we turn our attention to agencies with direct bearing on
horizontal relations among individuals, including firms. These agencies
fulfill indispensable tasks in sustaining many of our interpersonal
interactions and securing their compliance with the injunctions of relational
justice. Our particular focus is on the legal reasoning that guides these
agencies when they create, develop, or apply the norms that shape
entitlements. Working for the most part inductively, we show that regulatory
practice has more in common with traditional private law reasoning than has
been hitherto appreciated. Our analysis of these horizontally-oriented
agencies reveals how many of their practices and operational codes and
sensibilities are in fact adapted to their task of providing the infrastructure
of just relations. One way to put this conclusion is that it offers a
mirror-image of the familiar legal realist insight as to the public dimensions
of private law.13
Certain aspects of both the substance and form of these agencies, which
may seem off track from an aggregative perspective, become
straightforward once conceptualized as responses to the horizontal
challenges of participating in the creation of the infrastructure for just
interpersonal relations in core social settings, such as the workplace or the
market. Our evidence relies heavily on the way regulatory agencies (OSHA,
EEOC, NLRB) generate and maintain the baseline for just work
relationships.14 Indeed, much of the legal infrastructure of the
employer-employee relationship in contemporary settings in which law
takes certain contracting options off the table and uses other, more subtle
techniques to empower employees is not judge-made, but rather the product
of legislators and regulators.
These and other examples we discuss in Part II allow us to sketch a
preliminary prototype of relational agencies, thus filling the gap between
regulatory theory and the practice of agencies on the ground. Our account
offers practical payoffs: as usual, reflection on what we already do is useful
because articulating our premises can help organize our practice and push it
better to deliver on its implicit promise. Elucidating the relational role of
agencies refines its performance: if we better understand regulatory
purposes, we can fine-tune practice to fit those purposes. In addition, the
analysis has the potential to replace intuitive but sometimes loose
discussions of regulatory attention to vulnerable populations with a better
developed normative account of baseline entitlements required for
interpersonal relations to proceed on a just basis. Furthermore, our survey of
13
Cf. Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1959) (emphasizing
the prevalence and importance of public policy considerations in tort cases affecting group interests).
14
See infra text accompanying notes 119–34, 139–46, 148 (discussing OSHA as an example of an
agency that pursues relational justice in the workplace).
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the various techniques horizontally-oriented agencies utilize offers a
preliminary account of a regulatory toolkit suited for this task, which may
facilitate some cross-fertilization. Injecting these lessons into regulatory
theory may also allow skeptics (and skeptical agencies)—who do not yet
pay attention to the interpersonal dimension of regulation even where it
arguably exists and exerts practical force—at least to consider taking this
task seriously.
I. SITUATING THEORY: REGULATION, PRIVATE LAW, INSTITUTIONS
There are many institutions that engage in creating, applying,
interpreting, and developing the law. In our less careful jurisprudential
moments, we are liable to conflate three different features of this
multiplicity: the type of norm in question; the institution paradigmatically
responsible for making decisions about a given type of norm; and the kinds
of considerations that ought to inform the decision making process. Simple
examples may help clarify: norms of constitutional design (bicameralism or
a unified legislature? federal or unitary structure? official religion or
separation of church and state?) are promulgated by specialized procedures,
typically constitutional conventions that aspire to express an idealized
version of the will of the polity.15 Transnational soft law (e.g., Basel Accords
on standards of capital adequacy for banking) is formulated by international
bodies relying on expertise in coordination. Local land use norms (where
can I park? at what hour will the bars close?) are created by local
governments, animated by intimate knowledge regarding the preferences of
the affected public.
Conflating the type of norm, the responsible institution, and the kinds of
considerations to be weighed often supplies a convenient shorthand. At
times, however, the shorthand undermines our sensitivity to the overlaps,
crossovers, and possible mismatches between institutions and their bases for
decisions. In private law theory, the issue usually surfaces as a conflict over
whether courts deciding private disputes should consider distributive justice
or community concerns of any kind.16 The jurisprudential concern, however,
is more general. Comparative institutional analysis should certainly be
15
In their creation and subsequently in their interpretation and application by constitutional courts,
the idealized will of the polity supplies the dominant considerations.
16
See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 742–43 (1999)
(proposing that “progressive distributive considerations” be added to the regulatory takings doctrine);
Gregory C. Keating, Rawlsian Fairness and Regime Choice in the Law of Accidents, 72 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1857, 1858–59 (2004) (arguing for cost distribution among those benefiting from underlying risk in
accidental injury tort law); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort
Law, with Special References to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV.
563, 571–72 (1982) (describing how distributive rules of contract and tort systems are not always
motivated by distributive intentions). Cf. Donal Nolan, Tort and Public Law: Overlapping Categories?,
135 L.Q. REV. 272 (2019).
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mindful of the relative strengths and weaknesses of varied institutions in
terms of both their legitimacy and their competence in evaluating different
kinds of considerations. At the same time, we should remember that
identifications between institutions and considerations are partial,
contingent, and instrumental.
Our point is straightforward and descriptively not particularly original.
Students of regulatory agencies have long been aware of the role agencies
often play in creating the ground rules for market interaction and their
intermediate enforcement functions that require adjudication-like
consideration of private equities.17 However, the acknowledgment that at the
level of thick description agencies form a crucial part of the private law
system has not translated into a theoretical account of how aggregative and
horizontal considerations interact, or how such interaction might affect our
view of the task of the regulator.
Indeed, even if one assumes the usefulness of a shorthand that connects
private law and courts, administrators should often weigh considerations of
relational justice. There is no need to pitch battle over the proposition that
courts are paradigmatically suited to adjudicating claims of interpersonal
justice while regulators are paradigmatically geared toward aggregative
visions of the public interest. It is enough to note that at times, agencies are
a crucial instrumentality in laying the groundwork for relational justice. The
input of administrative determinations into the interpersonal regime of tort
law via the doctrine of negligence per se provides a straightforward example
for that.18 When those conditions hold, regulators should weigh
considerations of relational justice as animating features of their practice.
Relational regulators, who are the heroes of this Article, share with
judges the common purpose of prescribing the legally acceptable terms of

17
This was a central theme of legal process scholarship of the late 1950s, which we take to be the
modern starting point of comparative institutional analysis. For two central examples produced in the
1950s but published much later, see HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 9–12, 60–64 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) and Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV.
353, 374–76 (1978).
18
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 14 cmt. d (AM. LAW
INST. 2010) (discussing how the importance of negligence per se has increased with greater statutory and
regulatory controls); see also, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS 253 (2d ed. 2016)
(discussing “standard limits on application of statutory standards as negligence per se”); JOHN C. P.
GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO US LAW: TORTS 155–56
(2010) (describing “four qualifications” to negligence per se). The regulatory compliance defense and
the federal preemption doctrine may also be related, but they raise further complexities that are beyond
the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Mark A. Geistfeld, Tort Law in the Age of Statutes, 99 IOWA L. REV.
957, 996 (2014) (describing the relationship between the regulatory compliance defense and negligence
per se); Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 449, 480–81 (2008) (discussing the theoretical considerations of negligence per se within
the preemption debate).
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interpersonal interaction.19 Rather than a strict division of labor, we believe
that the institutional overlap between judges and regulators that typifies the
law in action is normatively the more attractive route.
A. Regulatory Theory and Aggregative Agencies
1. Regulation Without Relation
Unfortunately, relational regulators have no place in current regulatory
theory. Whereas there is no one canon of regulatory theory, the (oftentimes
implicit) conventional wisdom underlying the otherwise competing
accounts of the normative structure of the modern-state’s regulatory
apparatus is deeply aggregative. Law writ large, in this view, is not limited
to the private law tasks of securing individual property and facilitating
interpersonal transactions. Instead, our more general normative ordering
extends beyond private law and resorts to “the collectivist alternative”
offered by public law in order to secure “outcomes consistent with economic
welfare” or more generally with “the public interest.”20 As this proposition
suggests, theorists (like policymakers and practitioners) may not agree on
the specific goals that the regulatory enterprise should pursue, but there is
no disagreement that only “public interest goals” can legitimate the
regulatory “collective measures.”21
The least controversial set of justifications for regulation includes
various types of market failures, that is: cases in which for reasons like
monopolies or anti-competitive behavior, externalities or public goods, or
informational inadequacies, an “uncontrolled marketplace” is likely to “fail
to produce behaviour or results in accordance with the public interest.”22 But
at least some of the existing literature does not stop there. Regulation, in this
view, should not be limited to address market inefficiencies and maximize
consumer welfare. Rather, it should also seek to promote other social
rationales, such as protecting rights, securing distributive justice, or
facilitating social solidarity and deliberative citizenship.23 Pluralist theorists

19

The responsibility to relational justice of these regulators does not imply of course that they are
(or should be) free from the constraints of the statutory schemes that govern their operation and the
democratic oversight and political compromises that typically accompany these schemes. We do not
claim that the deference to the expertise of “relational justice professionals” should be different from that
which is duly accorded to other agency professionals.
20
ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 29 (1994).
21
Id.
22
ROBERT BALDWIN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE
15 (2d ed. 2012).
23
See, e.g., id. at 22–23 (discussing the purpose of “further[ing] social objectives”); TONY PROSSER,
THE REGULATORY ENTERPRISE: GOVERNMENT, REGULATION, AND LEGITIMACY 18 (2010) (describing
“four different rationales underlying regulation”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 55–63 (1990) (discussing the “Functions of Regulatory
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of regulation argue accordingly that although identifying the dominant
rationale for a given regulatory measure is important in order to “choose the
regulatory weapon best suited to the problem at hand,” many “regulatory
programs rest upon not one but several different rationales.”24 Importantly,
many students of regulation recognize the constitutive or foundational role
that regulation often plays in the creation and maintenance of markets: “It
determines the shape and indeed the possibility of the market somewhat as
DNA structures a life form and is prerequisite to such forms.”25
None of what we argue in this Article should be read as challenging the
obvious significance of the public interest—however it is defined—in any
assessment of the legitimacy or the performance of regulatory agencies. But
we nonetheless insist that this aggregative conception of the regulatory
apparatus of the modern state is incomplete. Some theorists of regulation
may, at least implicitly, realize the void which this Article seeks to fill. One,
somewhat attenuated, version of such awareness is the reference—under the
heading of “market failures”—to parties’ unequal bargaining power and to
collective action problems as justifications for regulation.26 However, these
references don’t seem to take these phenomena as inherently problematic,
but only as possible hindrances to the efficient operation of the market.27 A
more significant acknowledgment of the conceptual gap appears where
authors recognize that regulation may be required not to address a failure of
the market, but rather the absence of a market, or of an effective market.
Regulatory law “often serves to constitute market relations, to provide the
frameworks for rights and processes that allow markets to work, and to
protect markets from fragmentation.”28 Similarly, at times regulatory
agencies are said to engage in “market-making, market-moving,
market-levering, and market-preserving.”29
2. Public Interest Agencies
The focus of the prevailing regulatory theories on the public interest
nicely fits many agencies, whose mission is—at least in their current

Statutes,” including “Public-Interested Redistribution” and fulfilling “Collective Desires and
Aspirations”).
24
STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 34–35 (1982).
25
Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, “Private” Means to “Public” Ends: Governments as
Market Actors, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 53, 55 (2014).
26
See, e.g., respectively, BREYER, supra note 24, at 32; SUNSTEIN, supra note 23, at 49–52
(discussing unequal bargaining power and collective action problems).
27
A vivid demonstration of this is at times manifested where the adjective unequal or the term
unequal bargaining power appear in quotation marks. See, e.g., B REYER, supra note 24, at 32.
28
See, e.g., BALDWIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 15, 22 (discussing the effects of regulatory law on
markets).
29
Hockett & Omarova, supra note 25, at 56.
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incarnation30—clearly aggregative. The previous mission of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), for example, was “to ensure that:
all Americans are protected from significant risks to human health and the
environment where they live, learn and work.”31 The current EPA website
has replaced that sentence with a stated mission to ensure that “Americans
have clean air, land and water,” which portrays a similar public interest role,
albeit less directly.32 Likewise, “the mission of the Antitrust Division [of the
Department of Justice] is the promotion and maintenance of competition in
the American economy”;33 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) helps “fund
national priorities ranging from education to defense”;34 and the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) is in charge of ensuring the safety
and soundness of banks and savings associations in order to “promote[] a
vibrant and diverse banking system that benefits consumers, communities,
businesses, and the U.S. economy.”35
The public missions of these, and other,36 agencies explain¾as
canonical regulatory theory prescribes¾the significance of aggregating
social costs and benefits, and thus their heavy reliance on “a thorough and
careful economic analysis” as “an important component” of their rulemaking
process.37 They likewise justify the public-regarding focus on distributive
justice so that, for example, “everyone enjoys: the same degree of protection
from environmental and health hazards, and equal access to the

30

As will become clear by the end of this Article, the remainder of this Section should not be read as
an endorsement of the purely aggregative self-understanding of these agencies.
31
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2020 NAT’L ENVTL. JUST. CONF. & TRAINING PROGRAM,
https://thenejc.org/?sponsor=u-s-environmental-protection-agency (last visited Oct. 25, 2019). For an
archived version of the EPA website from January 19, 2017, see Our Mission and What We Do, ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-wedo_.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2019).
32
Our
Mission
and
What
We
Do,
ENVTL.
PROTECTION
AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do (last visited Oct. 25, 2019).
33
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUSTICE,
ANTITRUST
DIVISION
MANUAL
I-2
(2012),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/761166/download [hereinafter ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL].
34
Financial Services and General Government Appropriations for 2016: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. of Fin. Servs. & Gen. Gov’t Appropriations of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 114th Cong. 156
(2016) (statement of Jacob J. Lew, Secretary of the Treasury, in the form of a report titled “Congressional
Justification for Appropriations and Annual Performance Report and Plan FY 2016”).
35
About Us, OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY, https://occ.treas.gov/about/index-about.html (last
visited Oct. 8, 2019).
36
Such as the Federal Communications Commission whose public mission is to “make available . .
. to all the people of the United States . . . rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio
communication service.” FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN: 2015–2018, at 1 (2015),
https://transition.fcc.gov/Reports/strategic-plan-2015-2018.pdf.
37
Overview of Economic Analysis at the EPA, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/environmental-economics/overview-economic-analysis-epa (last visited Oct. 3, 2019).
See also, e.g., Hester Peirce, Economic Analysis by Federal Financial Regulators, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y
569, 569 (2013) (discussing the role of economic analyses in financial regulation).
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decision-making process to have a healthy environment in which to live,
learn, and work.”38
The concentration of these aggregative agencies on the public interest
dictates their more specific goals as well as their priorities. Thus, the EPA’s
strategic plan declares that “[w]e must focus on the environmental and
public-health issues that matter most to the American people,” and
accordingly mentions five strategic goals: “Addressing Climate Change and
Improving Air Quality”; “Protecting America’s Waters”; “Cleaning up
Communities and Advancing Sustainable Development”; “Ensuring the
Safety of Chemicals and Preventing Pollution”; and “Protecting Human
Health and the Environment by Enforcing Laws and Ensuring
Compliance.”39 The EPA channels “federal enforcement resources” along
similar lines, so as to maximize “the level of public health protection,” which
means that it is committed “to the largest most complex cases that have the
biggest impact,” even though that necessarily implies “doing fewer cases
overall.”40 Similar aggregative thinking underlies the priorities of other
agencies, such as the Antitrust Division and the OCC.41
Finally, the public missions and goals of this type of agencies42 also
explains the dominance of their vertical perspective. This perspective, in
turn, explains the heavy reliance of these agencies on criminal
enforcement.43 It also implies the ancillary, indeed strictly instrumental role,
of individual complaints: aggregative agencies typically44 do not seek to
resolve specific disputes but rather use complaints as merely one source of
information that can help identify major trends or systemic problems.45
38
Funding
for
Communities,
ENVTL.
PROTECTION
AGENCY,
http://www3.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2019).
39
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FY 2014–2018 EPA STRATEGIC PLAN 1, 4 (2014),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-09/documents/epa_strategic_plan_fy14-18.pdf
[hereinafter EPA STRATEGIC PLAN].
40
Id. at 38.
41
See ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 33, at I-2 (promoting “competition in the
American economy”); OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANK SUPERVISION PROCESS 1
(2019),
https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/pub-ch-epbsp.pdf (promoting “fair access to financial services,” among other goals).
42
See supra notes 31–41 and accompanying text.
43
See, e.g., ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 33, at I-2 (discussing purpose including
“[g]eneral criminal . . . enforcement of the Federal antitrust laws”); EPA STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note
39, at 38–40 (discussing an objective to “pursue vigorous . . . criminal enforcement” for environmental
safety); Criminal Investigation (CI) At-a-Glance, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Oct. 4, 2019),
https://www.irs.gov/uac/criminal-investigation-ci-at-a-glance (discussing mission of “investigating
potential criminal violations of the” Internal Revenue Code).
44
The OCC is an exception. See HelpWithMyBank.Gov, OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY (Aug.
2019), https://www.helpwithmybank.gov/index.html (discussing how the OCC addresses each individual
complaint).
45
See,
e.g.,
Consumer
Complaint
Center,
FED.
COMM.
COMMISSION,
https://consumercomplaints.fcc.gov/hc/en-us (last visited Oct. 3, 2019) (explaining how individual
complaints are used to “identify trends and track the issues”); Report Violations, DEP’T JUST.,
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B. Private Law Theory and the Contingency of Adjudication
1. Private Law Considerations
One popular view of private law presents a mirror-image of this
conventional association of regulation with the public interest. Private law,
in this view, is defined as concerning “the rights which, one against another,
people are able to realise in courts.”46 This court-centric view of private law
is a direct manifestation of the conventional equation of private law with
common law adjudication. It implies, for example, that workers’
compensation schemes, which substitute administration for adjudication,
should not be deemed extensions of tort law; the shift from the domain of
one-to-one litigation before a judge to the administrative apparatus implies,
in other words, a jurisdictional transfer of authority from private law to
public law.47
Indeed, like the prevailing theories of regulation, this account of private
law conflates types of norms, legal reasoning, and institutions. But the
feature that makes private law a meaningful legal category is not
institutional.48 Rather, it lies in the types of considerations that supply the
justifications of its substantive norms. Thus, the conception of private law
that guides us here appreciates the significance of having a body of law that
specifically governs our interpersonal, horizontal relationships, as opposed
to our interactions as subjects of the state or as co-citizens. The orientation
of our law toward us is qualitatively salient: it makes a difference whether
we are addressed as bearers of material needs, as parts of a comprehensive
unit of joint responsibility, or—as it is with private law—as persons with
projects.
Recognizing the significance of private law along these lines need not
be confused with an exercise of separation, which looks for necessary and
sufficient differences between private and public law that would make them
https://www.justice.gov/atr/report-violations (last visited Oct. 3, 2019) (explaining how violation reports
are handled).
46
Peter Birks, Introduction to 1 ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW, at xxxv, xxxvi (Peter Birks ed., 2000).
47
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 919 (2010).
See also, e.g., Nathan B. Oman & Jason M. Solomon, The Supreme Court’s Theory of Private Law, 62
DUKE L.J. 1109, 1119 (2013) (contesting the conflation of private law with regulations of the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration or the Federal Trade Commission).
48
Conceptualizing private law as a distinct legal category may seem normatively empty and a mere
distraction for scholars, such as lawyer-economists, who perceive private law as just one option for the
state to enact and administer rules that incentivize people to act in line with the general welfare. When
posed at a level of theoretical purity, this yields a reductionist view of private law that marginalizes or
completely ignores private law’s distinctive value, thus rendering the subject-matter of our inquiry a
priori hollow. But as is often the case, the lawyer-economists have things half-right. They miss the boat
by assuming that there are no normatively significant features that ground private law; on the other hand,
they touch on an important insight in recognizing that there may be varied institutional tools geared
toward common outcomes.
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mutually exclusive. Some private law theories pursue this strategy, but we
find it unsatisfying. That strategy assumes that law can and should structure
our interpersonal relationships with no account for our collective goals, such
as distributive justice (which focuses on justice in holdings), democratic
citizenship (which seeks to eradicate hierarchies in our relationships qua
citizens), or efficiency (which is concerned with the size of our welfarist
pie).49
A different conception of private law, which one of us has elaborated
and defended elsewhere,50 is dramatically different. Its point is neither
doctrinal separation nor strict division of labor. Rather, the importance of
private law relies on the freestanding significance of the social, a realm
always in interaction with, but not reducible to, the public.51 Recognizing
the value (and potential threat) of our horizontal interactions in the array of
social spheres governed by private law—such as family, work, home,
community, and commerce—implies that goals like efficiency, democratic
citizenship, and distributive justice, while always potentially relevant,
should not exhaust private law’s normative concerns. Private law is a
meaningful legal category quite apart from its contribution to these public
purposes. That meaning lies in delineating what people owe each other in
the framework of social interaction. Private law undergirds our interpersonal
obligations as private individuals rather than our obligations as co-citizens.52
It supplies a set of considerations that focus precisely on such social contact,
and the dominance of those considerations is private law’s distinguishing
feature. 53 More than any other part of the law, private law sets the conditions
of legitimate interaction among individuals; it underpins (an important
subset of) our quotidian horizontal relationships as persons.54
Resisting private law’s reductionist understanding as exhausted by
public considerations does not imply that it ought to be analyzed solely as a
stronghold of individual independence and formal equality, while leaving
the task of realizing the commitments to individual self-determination and
substantive equality to public law. This understanding of private law seems
conventional, but the division of labor on which it relies cannot withstand
49

Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Postscript to Just Relationships: Reply to Gardner, West,
and Zipursky, 117 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 261, 268–69 (2017).
50
See Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1397
(2016) [hereinafter Dagan & Dorfman, Just Relationships] (distinguishing private law as governing
interpersonal relationships, whereas public law governs the relationships of individuals with the
government); Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Justice in Private: Beyond the Rawlsian Framework,
37 LAW & PHIL. 171, 173–74 (2018) (arguing that, charitably interpreted, private law vindicates relational
justice); Dagan & Dorfman, Postscript to Just Relationships, supra note 49, at 261 (elaborating upon the
distinction between public and private law through a focus on the normative status of private law).
51
Dagan & Dorfman, Just Relationships, supra note 50, at 1398.
52
Id. at 1397.
53
Id. at 1399.
54
Id. at 1398.
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critical scrutiny.55 Any polity that takes seriously the commitment to
individual self-determination (and not merely independence) and to
substantive (rather than merely formal) equality cannot make these values
irrelevant to our interpersonal relationships. Quite the contrary: these values
are just as crucial to our horizontal interactions as they are to our vertical
ones, although they entail different implications in these different
dimensions.
Private law is actually committed to enhancing a capacious vision of
autonomy, rather than merely to safeguarding independence; and it does not
content itself with formal equality, but rather aims at positively establishing
our substantive equality.56 Numerous doctrines of private law—including
veteran common law rules that require potential tortfeasors to accommodate
the relevant constitutive features of their victims,57 help solve collective
action problems,58 or oblige recipients of mistaken payments to reverse
mistakes for which they have no responsibility59—are straightforward
implications of the injunction of reciprocal respect to self-determination and
substantive equality. These and many other examples support the
interpretation of private law as the realm of relational justice.60
This charitable reading of private law is controversial, but that
controversy does not undermine our point here. Critics may offer competing
interpretations of the interpersonal responsibilities entrenched in private
law.61 Fortunately, arbitrating such controversies is unnecessary for our
purposes because nothing in what follows hangs on the endorsement of this
particular account. All that is needed for the purposes of this Article is the
modest, quite banal, proposition that private law includes much more than
duties of abstention; that the law of our interpersonal interactions as
individuals is also the law of our interpersonal responsibilities towards one
another.62
2. Beyond Adjudication
Courts are often useful for the development and implementation of
private law. Common law judges indeed carried much of this burden
historically. Friends of the common law tradition celebrate its “Grand
Style,” described by Karl Llewellyn as “a functioning harmonization of
vision with tradition, of continuity with growth, of machinery with purpose,
55

Id. at 1408.
Id. at 1397.
57
Id. at 1431–38.
58
Id. at 1445–51.
59
Id. at 1456–58.
60
See id. at 1430–59 (applying principles of relational justice in the fields of property and contracts).
61
Id. at 1401.
62
See, e.g., JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, RECOGNIZING WRONGS 69–70
(2020).
56
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of measure with need,” mediating between “the seeming commands of the
authorities and the felt demands of justice.”63 This mode of decision making
renders adjudication a particularly hospitable arena for the complex task of
fashioning and refashioning the legal infrastructure of interpersonal
relationships. It invites judges to engage in what Benjamin Cardozo called
an “endless process of testing and retesting.”64 It encourages them to shape
and reshape law “close and contemporary” to the human problems they deal
with, taking benefit from “the discrimination necessary for intimacy of
treatment.”65 And at the same time, its typical piecemeal, gradual mode of
operation retains the common law’s loyalty to the two important aspects of
the rule of law: the requirement that law be capable of guiding its subjects’
behavior, and the prescription that law not confer on officials the right to
exercise unconstrained power.66
There is another reason the connection between private law and
adjudication seems natural. While the ultimate result of a system of private
law is a comprehensive scheme of entitlements governing our interpersonal
interactions that prescribes our primary rights and duties, private law’s
straightforward means of enforcement entails the arming of rights-holders
with the power to decide how to respond to infringement of their rights as
well as the standing to instigate a complaint.67 Court proceedings are
sensibly perceived as the obvious venue for this exercise: adjudication as a
forum is specifically designed to assess the parties’ behavior vis-à-vis their
interpersonal rights and obligations as well as to refine the rules that
delineate these rights and obligations to begin with.68 Furthermore, even
though the yield of the process does not perfectly mirror these rights,69 these
gaps do not undermine the sense in which courts’ rulings and orders serve

63

KARL L. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 37–38 (1960).
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 179 (1921).
65
Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A.J. 71, 74 (1928).
66
See Hanoch Dagan, Doctrinal Categories, Legal Realism, and the Rule of Law, 163 U. PA. L.
REV. 1889, 1898–1905 (2015) (conceptualizing Legal Realism as accepting the stabilizing force of
doctrinal categories while allowing for judges and legislators to occasionally rethink conventional
doctrine).
67
This point is (over-)emphasized by proponents of both corrective justice and civil recourse
theories. See, e.g., respectively, ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, PRIVATE WRONGS 271–75 (2016) (detailing the need
for rights-holders to actively pursue corrective justice through adjudication; GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY,
supra note 62, at 111–46 (defending the principle of civil recourse).
68
This in any event does not imply that adjudication by aggrieved parties is the signature of private
law, since it also typifies large swaths of public law. See Avihay Dorfman, Private Law Exceptionalism?
Part I: A Basic Difficulty with the Structural Arguments from Bipolarity and Civil Recourse, 35 LAW &
PHIL. 165, 177–85 (2016) (discussing adjudication by aggrieved parties for infringement upon their
constitutional rights).
69
See, e.g., Stephen A. Smith, Duties, Liabilities, and Damages, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1727, 1727
(2012) (delineating two types of damage awards: those that confirm existing duties to others, and those
that create duties to others).
64
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as focused responses to plaintiffs’ complaints given remedies’ participation
in the constitution of rights and not only their enforcement.70
These are weighty reasons for the association of private law with
adjudication, and more generally, of the importance of our access to courts.
But they do not imply that private law only appears, thrives, or survives
when run by judges. Quite the contrary, these advantages of adjudication are
contingent upon a certain adjudicatory tradition and upon a set of
background empirical assumptions and normative conjectures. Court-centric
private law may thus be suboptimal in its own terms, namely, judged
vis-à-vis its ideal of relational justice. This may be the case for the obvious,
but practically important, reason that the existing private law institutions of
adjudication (alternative dispute resolutions included) fail to respond
effectively enough to the demand for dispute resolution,71 or that their
response is disturbingly affected by the respective parties’ ability to pay or
other asymmetrical limitations of the access to justice.72 It may also derive
from more general considerations.
Complying with private law’s underlying commitment to structure our
interpersonal relationships so that they are governed by reciprocal respect to
individual self-determination mandates the provision of an infrastructure for
a secure marketplace within which effective choices can be made. This is a
mission that often requires private law to recruit an administrative apparatus,
supplementing or even supplanting courts.73 The fundamental institutional
70

See HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & RETHINKING PRIVATE
LAW THEORY 144–60 (2013) (positing, through a discussion of the relationship between rights and
remedies, that legal realism views remedies as a core component of rights).
71
See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
119, 129, 131 (2002) (“A recent study utilized state court data to demonstrate that the use of particular
processes, such as alternative dispute resolution (ADR), does not correlate with shortened disposition
times, while the factors that do so correlate, such as forum locale and case category, are simply beyond
the reach of process-oriented reform.”); George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion
Problem, 69 B.U. L. REV. 527, 527, 529–30, 557–58 (1989) (detailing the various measures used to
respond to the problem of litigation delay and noting that ADR rules do not have significant effect).
72
See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3–5 (2004) (highlighting the gap between
rhetorical commitments concerning access to justice and the true reality that millions of Americans lack
equal access); Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 98, 103–04, 121–22 (1974) (describing how the advantages of “haves”
over “have-nots” is perpetuated and augmented by wealth and power).
73
See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTHCENTURY AMERICA 1–2 (1996) (discussing “the pervasiveness of regulation in early American versions
of the good society”); William E. Forbath, Politics, State-Building, and the Courts, 1870–1920, in 2 THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 643, 643 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds.,
2008) (explaining that, in nineteenth-century America, at the state level, “America had little
‘administration’ beyond local officials; not high administrators but judges supervised the work of local
officialdom”); Catherine M. Sharkey, The Administrative State and the Common Law: Regulatory
Substitutes or Complements?, 65 EMORY L.J. 1705, 1706–07, 1710, 1734, 1739 (2016) (arguing that
administrative agencies have emerged as a fourth branch of government, which has had widespread
impacts on tort law); see also, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory
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limitations of the judiciary in a complex and interconnected environment
imply that fulfilling private law’s relational task may necessitate regulatory
underpinning. Such regulation may be necessary for ensuring the generality
of legal prescription, for maintaining the required technological expertise for
legal decision making, and for the targeting of systemic market failures that
can hardly be addressed on the transactional level. It may also be necessary
in order to establish effective tools for proactive (as opposed to reactive) ex
ante guarantees of just interpersonal relationships in various social settings
and to ensure that they are sufficiently predictable so as to effectively guide
people’s behavior as required by the rule of law. Finally, these reasons for
handing over part of private law’s mission to regulators are augmented once
we recall that the challenge of private law is not to resist the influence of our
public commitments (that is, of values such as distributive justice,
democratic citizenship, or aggregate welfare), but rather to respond to the
injunctions of the maxim of just relationships, while remaining sensitive to
these important public concerns.74
Indeed, although adjudication is often a perfectly sensible mechanism
for private law to employ, private law can be, is, and sometimes should also
be made, applied, interpreted, and developed in other arenas.
C. Hayek’s Objections
Our main focus in this Article is on the implications of this proposition
on the theory and practice of certain agencies, those that are properly
analyzed as indeed responsible, at least in part, for carrying out private law
tasks. But before we proceed in this direction, it may be advisable to consider
possible objections to the placement of such authority in the hands of
regulators, as opposed to judges. While such objections may come from
various directions, they all converge into the powerful critique of the
regulatory state by one of the most enthusiastic advocates of the common
law, Friedrich Hayek.
Hayek insisted that private law (or law more generally) properly so
called is judge-made law, and is thus distinct from both statutes and “special
commands or permissions by administrative agencies.”75 His argument for
this conceptual distinctiveness and normative superiority of the common law
is broad and complex; but for our purposes it is helpful to disentangle it into
three separate propositions (which he combines). First, the common law
State, 41 J. ECON. LITERATURE 401, 401–03 (2003) (proposing a new economic theory that addresses
how private litigation, government regulation, and a combination of the two are used to secure property
rights).
74
See Dagan, supra note 12, at 83 (noting that the purpose of autonomy-based private law is to
refine interpersonal concerns, not to eliminate all public concerns).
75
1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 127, 132–33, 136 (1982);
2 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 34 (1982).
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enjoys a form of generality unavailable to the regulator.76 Judge-made law,
on this account, is not “invented or designed” in order to serve a specific
purpose; rather, it is a set of abstract and universal “rules of just conduct,”
sharply contrasted with the “discrimination and discretion” that the
operation of administrative agencies necessarily involves.77 These rules
govern the behavior of persons towards others; they are applicable “to an
unknown number of future instances”;78 and they contain “prohibitions
delimiting the boundary of the protected domain of each person (or
organized group of persons).”79 They thus “enable an order of actions to
form itself wherein the individuals can make feasible plans” and effectively
pursue them.80
Second, the common law, in sharp contrast to legislation or regulation,
is spontaneous and organic. It is neither “the product of anyone’s will,”81
nor is it “something the mind could deliberately create”;82 rather, it
“spring[s] from the articulation of previously existing practices” or
“customs.”83 The common law is a product of a “spontaneous process of
growth”84 of a set of “practices on which the everyday conduct of the
members of the group [is] based,”85 resting on “a diffused opinion of what
is right.”86 Judge-made law is based on “the experience gained by the
experimentation of generations,” which “embodies more knowledge than
was possessed by anyone”; and it is “discovered either in the sense that
[judges] merely articulate already observed practices or in the sense that [it
includes] required complements of the already established rules.”87
Finally, judge-made law is independent of the capricious will of
legislators, regulators, or the interest groups that drive them. The common
law is “determined by courts independent of the power which organize[s]
and direct[s] government.”88 Judges “are not normally concerned with
relations of command and obedience, only such actions of individuals as
affect other persons.”89 They serve to “maintain and improve a going order
76
1 HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER, supra note 75, at 86 (“[L]aw which . . . emerges from the judicial
process is necessarily abstract . . . . ”).
77
Id. at 85, 86, 138.
78
2 HAYEK, MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 75, at 35.
79
1 HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER, supra note 75, at 122.
80
Id. at 85–86; see also 2 HAYEK, MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 75, at 36–37 (describing
the function of rules of just conduct).
81
1 HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER, supra note 75, at 85.
82
Id. at 97.
83
Id. at 85–86.
84
Id. at 88.
85
Id. at 96–97.
86
Id. at 95.
87
Id. at 119, 123.
88
Id. at 85.
89
Id. at 101.
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which nobody has designed, an order that has formed itself without the
knowledge and often against the will of authority.”90 Thus, their product—
the common law—can serve “as a barrier to all power,” rather than “an
instrument for the use of power.”91 It is again the mirror image of the product
of legislation and regulation, whose “whole history” is one “of continuous
struggle to prevent particular groups from abusing the governmental
apparatus for the benefit of the collective interest of these groups.”92
***
We are far from willing to sign on to Hayek’s depiction of the law, which
has little basis in history and strikes us as vulnerable to compelling critique,
both logical and normative. Nonetheless, Hayek’s drawing of sharp
analytical boundaries between regulation and adjudication proves useful in
clarifying thought regarding the relative place of these institutional
mechanisms.93 Each of these three propositions involves an important lesson
for the making of private law, but none of them implies the exclusivity or
even hegemony of judges in carrying out this enterprise.94
Hayek’s first proposition echoes to some extent our conception of
private law as the law of just interpersonal relationships conducive to selfdetermining individuals. But it misleadingly tightens the connection
between private law and judge-made law by offering two indefensible
oppositions between adjudication and administrative agencies regarding
abstraction, on the one hand, and pure prohibition on the other.
Regarding abstraction, Hayek presents the products of adjudication as
universal, abstract rules and the workings of administration as necessarily
about particularistic purposes. But this must be wrong, because the
distinction between general rulemaking and the pursuit of particular
purposes does not track the institutional divide between judges and
administrators.95 The rule of law requirement of generality, on which this
first opposition relies, means that legal rules must be applicable to all their
addressees equally rather than singling out particular groups for special
90

Id. at 118–19.
Id. at 92.
92
2 HAYEK, MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 75, at 6.
93
Our critique of Hayek’s rigid distinctions will become clear presently. For an account with deep
alliances to Hayek’s own, but which draws many of the same distinctions as matters of degree, see
WALTER LIPPMANN, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE GOOD SOCIETY 282–93 (1937). For an
analysis of the affinities between Lippmann and Hayek and of Lippmann’s influence on German ordoliberalism, see ANGUS BURGIN, THE GREAT PERSUASION: REINVENTING FREE MARKETS SINCE THE
DEPRESSION 57–78 (2012).
94
Cf. Sharkey, supra note 73, at 1733–34 (noting that courts must oversee a newer common law
regime that utilizes input from federal regulatory agencies).
95
To be fair, Hayek elsewhere acknowledges as much, in a discussion of administrative bodies that
exercise limited discretion and apply general rules, with examples drawn from the supply of a monetary
system, the setting of weights and measures, land registration (including building codes), and education.
F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 222–28 (1960).
91
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treatment.96 This entails that there should be rules that are more abstract than
their particularistic instantiations,97 and is thus, as Hayek himself
acknowledges, “a matter of degree.”98 Identifying the right degree of
abstraction is a complex question, whose answer may well change across
legal fields. In any event, there is no a priori reason to suppose that
administrative agencies are less likely than judges (or constitutionally
unable) to respect the requirement of generality or are more amenable than
their brethren and sistren on the bench to the ad hoc application of unbridled
discretion. In fact, there are good contextual reasons to suppose that agencies
are usually more sensitive to the requirement of generality. Beyond
particular and contingent examples, both forms of law-making include
constraining institutional doctrines—such as the requirement that judges
justify their decision in universalizable terms or the due process
prescriptions of agency fair procedure—that seek to ensure this important
aspect of the rule of law.
Regarding the negative or prohibitory character of private law rules,
Hayek’s purported opposition between adjudication and administrative
agencies is no more convincing. Common law rules, like many rules set by
administrative agencies, often lay out general requirements for anyone
interested in pursuing a given activity.99 Further, as we have indicated above,
the common law, pace Hayek, is not only about prohibitions, but rather
includes positive duties of interpersonal accommodation. These duties, as
we further clarified, are essential if private law is to fulfil the role Hayek
ascribes to it of facilitating people’s ability to be the authors of their own
lives.100
96

Id. at 226.
See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 48 (1964) (noting the need for general principles in
legal systems).
98
1 HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER, supra note 75, at 140. See also HAYEK, supra note 95, at 226
(explaining that rather than making distinctions between different people, there should be more general
rules).
99
For a simple example, consider the requirement that one undertaking a dangerous activity employ
due care. But even common law rules as basic as those of contract formation impose positive
requirements on those seeking to perform legally valid acts. See HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER,
THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS 37–39, 45–46 (2017) (exploring the modest affirmative
interpersonal duties at the foundation of contract law). The characterization of the common law as
inherently prohibitory in nature is untenable.
100
See supra Section II.B.1 (discussing relational justice and the idea that significant representation
is a step on the way to helping people view the system as one of their own authorship). If one assumes,
as Hayek sometimes does, that the only legitimate aim of the law is to “ascertain the boundary of the
protected domain of each [person] and thus to distinguish between the meum and the tuum,” 1 HAYEK,
RULES AND ORDER, supra note 75, at 107–08, then private law (or law more generally) might include
only prohibitions. But this assumption presupposes a private law limited to the protection of property,
with no substantive account of the power-conferring aspect of private law without which the law of
contract—and, in fact, of property—is scarcely imaginable. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Markets for
Self-Authorship, 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 577, 580–83 (2018) (noting how markets contribute to
self-authorship and recognizing property and contract law as “power-conferring legal doctrines”). Such
97
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Hayek’s second proposition also contains a grain of significant truth,
insofar as it emphasizes the role of experience in the development of law. At
least since Holmes’s famous quip that experience is the life of the law, it
would be difficult to argue otherwise.101 Hayek correctly claims that learning
from experience is one of the pillars of the common law tradition, which
perceives law as a great human laboratory continuously seeking
improvement,102 and his turn to custom as a source of law has romantic
appeal as well as some genuine common law pedigree.103 It pays, however,
to distinguish between the appeal to experience on the one hand, and the
reliance on custom and especially spontaneous order, on the other.
As far as reliance on experience is concerned, there is little reason to
think it is the exclusive province of adjudication. Administrative regulation
is generally as much a product of experience as judge-made law, and often
built upon more comprehensive reflection on such experience. It is
particularly salient for sophisticated administrative apparatuses, which
include complex mechanisms of experimentalism and learning.104 In short,
if we emphasize the experiential aspect of Hayek’s second proposition, it is
supportable on its own, but not as an argument to distinguish adjudication
from administrative regulation.
Hayek’s appeal to custom and spontaneity may have a tighter link to
adjudication,105 but it is unattractive normatively, for a number of reasons.
First, custom is limited in its capability to adapt, while, as Hayek recognizes,
sometimes the common law needs “to deal with altogether new problems,”
or start anew reversing its path after reaching “an impasse” or realizing
“undesirable consequences.”106 But even with regard to problems that are
a conception cannot plausibly serve as private law’s foundation not only due to its normative failures,
but also, as we argued above, because it is simply too distant from existing doctrine to supply a plausible
account of the practice.
101
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
102
See supra text accompanying notes 63–64 (describing the common law tradition as one that
invites fashioning and refashioning).
103
See KUNAL M. PARKER, COMMON LAW, HISTORY, AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 1790-1900:
LEGAL THOUGHT BEFORE MODERNISM 25 (2011) (noting that there are two “temporalities” in thinking
about law: the historical and the customary).
104
See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) (exploring how democratic experimentalism increases
administrative efficiency and heightens administrative accountability); see also IAN AYRES & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 4–5 (1992)
(describing the positive qualities of responsive regulation); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon,
Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 55, 79, 83 (2011)
(discussing experimentalism’s similarities to responsive regulation and its mechanisms for achieving
learning and coordination).
105
There is, of course, some debate on the question whether and to which degree the common law
follows custom. See, e.g., John Hasnas, Hayek, The Common Law, and Fluid Drive, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 79, 94 (2004) (agonizing over the departure of the common law from custom).
106
1 HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER, supra note 75, at 88, 100.
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not new, it always pays to be cautious about custom, notwithstanding the
rhetorical appeal of what is portrayed as “bottom-up” law.107 Preliminarily,
custom is notoriously difficult to pin down as a source of law, especially as
an independent source of law distinct from reason.108 Additionally,
customary norms are often prone to inefficiency owing to pervasive
information problems and strategic behavior.109 More importantly, Hayek’s
Darwinian “evolutionary functionalism” is normatively odious: many
“stable tyrannies” are “ideal-typical instances of Hayekian spontaneous
social order,” and it is bewildering why these, and other similarly unjust but
both spontaneous and stable orders, deserve to be celebrated and
entrenched.110 Indeed, the appeal to the supposed spontaneity of custom
betrays a deafness to the typical ways power cloaks itself in tradition,
naturalizing relations whose basis is arbitrary or violent.
Finally, like Hayek’s first two propositions, his third is also important,
but again does not justify the conceptual separation he seeks to establish.
Hayek’s concern that administrative agencies and legislatures are subject to
pressure from interest groups seeking to capture private benefits at the
expense of the public good has by now become conventional wisdom for
students of regulation and legislation.111 But most of them do not give up on
the idea that administrators and legislators can properly pursue public
interests. The reasons vary. Some point to the contribution of administrative
law, which evolved dramatically since Hayek’s skeptical account was
written, in curbing such influences.112 Others remind us that questions of
107
Hayek himself expressed skepticism about customary communities which have been celebrated
in recent times by authors such as Robert Ellickson and Robert Cooter. See Robert W. Gordon, Hayek
and Cooter on Custom and Reason, 23 SW. U. L. REV. 453, 454 (1994) (contrasting Hayek’s views about
customary communities with those of Cooter).
108
See James Q. Whitman, Why Did the Revolutionary Lawyers Confuse Custom and Reason?, 58
U. CHI. L. REV. 1321, 1322 (1991) (discussing the “somewhat unclear mingling” of custom and reason
as sources of law).
109
See Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1713,
1725–26 (1996) (exploring the problem of inefficient norms that result from information problems and
strategic behavior).
110
John Gray, Hayek on Liberty, Rights, and Justice, 92 ETHICS 73, 83 (1981).
111
For classic formulations, see MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 1, 144 (1965); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI . 3, 4 (1971) (advancing the argument that “regulation is
acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit”). For a review of the field,
see David Freeman Engstrom, Corralling Capture, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 31, 31–32 (2013)
(seeking “more rigor in how we think and talk about the idea of . . . [the] process by which policy is
directed away from the public interest and toward the interests of a regulated industry”).
112
See generally STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF
GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT (2007) (discussing the decision making environment of government
agencies and arguing that the regulatory government can advance general interests); Jerry L. Mashaw,
Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 26 (2001) (defending administrative law due to the requirements placed on
administrators to “be both transparent and contemporaneous”); Edward H. Stiglitz, Delegating for Trust,

343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd 100

7/28/20 10:47 AM

REGULATORY THEORY

2020]

629

institutional competence (and thus of expected performance) as well as of
institutional legitimacy are always comparative,113 and that Hayek himself
acknowledged occasions in which “whole sections of the established system
of case law” turn out to be “unjust” and must be dramatically revised given
“the greater influence that certain groups like landlords, employers,
creditors, etc., had wielded on the formation of the law.”114
We do not purport to resolve these comparative institutional questions
here of course, partly because we doubt that they are amenable to one right
answer across the wide range of thematic variation and the broad spectrum
of institutional cultures of the judiciary and the public administration in
different jurisdictions. Fortunately, no such answer is needed for our
purpose. Hayek’s concerns of bias and capture are valid vis-à-vis all the
carriers of law’s power. So, nothing in our account implies that the
regulatory schemes that supplement or supplant courts in carrying out
private law’s interpersonal mission should be exempt from these concerns.
II. TOWARD A THEORY OF RELATIONAL REGULATORS
A. Relations for Regulation
Establishing and maintaining a just scheme of interpersonal
relationships has never been a simple matter. Modern societies are complex,
and setting up an effective legal infrastructure that vindicates mutual
obligation is a daunting challenge. It is thus increasingly difficult to expect
courts, whose modus operandi is reactive and whose perspective and
information on key categories of relationships we have—with employers,
landlords, banks, and the like—are framed by specific disputes they
encounter, to face these challenges on their own. Given the comparative
institutional advantages of legislatures and administrative agencies on these
fronts, it should be neither surprising nor objectionable to observe their
heavy participation in these core tasks of private law, either in
supplementing or in supplanting courts.115
The responsibility of securing just social relationships is different from
the responsibility of serving the interest of the public as a whole. “[I]t is one
thing for the state to respect its constituents as genuinely free and equal
70 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 649 (2018) (analyzing how administrative lawmaking “is more responsive to
public interests”).
113
See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3 (1994) (advancing the argument that “comparative institutional
analysis” is predicated on a comparison of decision making alternatives).
114
1 HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER, supra note 75, at 89, 141.
115
See JOSEPH W. SINGER, NO FREEDOM WITHOUT REGULATION: THE HIDDEN LESSON OF THE
SUBPRIME CRISIS 74, 125 (2015) (noting that “minimum standards” for relationships are based on several
lawmaking procedures including: court interpretations, statutes, administrative rules, and state
regulations).
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persons; it is quite another to live in a society that expects individuals
themselves to comply with the ideal of just relationships between free and
equal agents.”116 Taking this responsibility seriously requires the pertinent
legal actors—such as the regulators that we study here—to think
horizontally and to adjust their substantive, structural, and procedural
features to the task at hand.
Indeed, regulation often plays an important role in supplying the
infrastructure for just relations among individuals. In so doing, it does not
and need not rely exclusively on aggregative considerations. As we have
seen, regulatory theory typically assumes such an exclusive aggregate focus,
which fits a subset of the administrative apparatus: the agencies which carry
a predominantly public task.117 Our goal in what follows is to show that other
agencies—the other half of the regulatory universe—are better analyzed
differently.118 We do not deny that they may also be justified in public law
terms; we do not argue, in other words, that the original justifications for
their establishment, which are mainly aggregative,119 are sheer cover-up
triggered by the need to justify federal jurisdiction in compliance with the
Commerce Clause. Rather, we claim that this aggregative perspective
accounts for only part—and not necessarily the most significant part—of the
picture. Therefore, if not supplemented with a developed horizontal
perspective, the aggregative account generates a partial, even distorted,
understanding of this important subset of our regulatory universe.
We begin with a sketch of two agencies: the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) and the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB). Our aim is not to offer a comprehensive account of these
complex agencies, but rather to show that at least some of their tasks and the
means they use in order to attain them are best understood in relational terms.
The main—or at least one important—goal of both agencies is the
construction and maintenance of just interpersonal relationships in the
respective social spheres they regulate. Accordingly, quite a few of the
features of their modus operandi are attuned to this relational mission.
116

Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 50, at 1460.
See supra Section I.A.2.
118
We thus share the critique—premised on different reasons from ours—of existing regulatory
theory for being insufficiently attuned to the heterogeneity of observed regulatory practice. See Cary
Coglianese, Bounded Evaluation: Cognition, Incoherence, and Regulatory Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV.
1217, 1219, 1235–37 (2002) (arguing that cognitive limitations impact regulatory policies and judgments
about regulatory policies); Steven P. Croley, Beyond Capture: Towards a New Theory of
Regulation, in HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 50, 57, 59–60, 64 (David Levi-Faur ed.,
2011) (arguing that capture theory might be too general to provide practical insight for real-world policy
issues).
119
See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2012)) (referring to aggregative justifications and purposes for federal
workplace health and safety policies).
117
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We use these two examples to venture a preliminary account of
horizontal agencies, which take their responsibility to relational justice
seriously. One takeaway of this account is to resist the “public law
reductionism” that increasingly strict and not sufficiently discriminating
cost-benefit analysis requirements of administrative agencies may
generate. 120 To reiterate: we do not imply that cost-benefit analysis should
be irrelevant to the more relational agencies we study; the aggregative effect
of all agency regulations surely implies that their welfarist implications are
pertinent even with respect to these agencies. But we insist that the closer
we come to the pole of the relational agency, the more troubling it is if
cost-benefit analysis overshadows or even erases the private law sensibilities
we identify.
B. Two Examples
1. OSHA
Abstractly analyzed, there is nothing unique in job-related injuries. Like
other types of harms, some of these injuries are properly analyzed as
violations of relational duties, which means that the responsibility for their
prevention and the costs of their occurrence should not be allocated to the
worker, but rather to another person, notably her employer. The adjudicatory
process, namely, the common law of torts, offers a straightforward way to
implement this proposition. Of course, this conclusion is merely a shorthand
for a slightly subtler point. The costs of injury are not allocated to the
particular worker injured on the job, but rather spread among the
stakeholders in the activity more generally: employers or insurers cover the
immediate costs of an injury that befalls the particular worker; workers (by
sacrificing some of their wages) or consumers (by paying higher prices) or
shareholders fund the coverage. Losses are shared among a group of people
who benefit from the activity.121
But tort law is not essential for this task, and the shift to other means of
securing compliance with these duties—for pragmatic or other reasons of
the kind we have discussed earlier—does not imply a repudiation of this
120
For a (rather modest) attempt to ameliorate this concern, see Jeremy K. Kessler & David E.
Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle Theory of Legal Theories, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1819,
1866–68 (2016).
121
The underlying point here is that the duties of the employer to the employee are part of a wider
net of interpersonal justice claims. A web of benefitting parties shares responsibility for the costs of
injuries. But the collective responsibility for the ultimate cost does not undermine the special role of the
employer, as the person in control of the conditions of work, in attending to care for the prevention of
injury. Creating an economic incentive for the employer to generate safe working conditions is one way
of making her focus on an interpersonal duty, but it is not necessarily the most effective way to ensure
that focus. More direct duties that solve information uncertainties might be better suited to the task, and
their accompaniment by insurance schemes would not undermine the core responsibility at stake in
relational terms.
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injunction of relational justice. Indeed, relational justice need not object to
alternative schemes, such as workers’ compensation schemes, as long as
they make some room for the types of legal doctrines—for example,
injunctive relief and punitive damages for intentional misconduct—that
ensure compliance with the employer’s duty of care.122
Our analysis of OSHA falls within this broad framework. To be sure,
our point is not that the scheme prescribed by the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 mimics the results of traditional negligence law. Quite
the contrary, part of the point of this Act is to generate measures that
strengthen employers’ ex ante compliance with this interpersonal duty, a
duty that instantiates a legitimate relation between particular employers and
particular employees.123 Indeed, the common law of torts, with its traditional
requirement of a completed wrong, is inapt for the task because it cannot
properly respond to the irreparable harms at hand and workers’
compensation schemes do not obviate this difficulty. In particular, no award
of money damages can restore victims of wrongful death their lost means
(life), and that is also true of injuries such as mangled limbs or blindness. Ex
ante regulation of risk is, at least in principle, the proper response to this
predicament.124
Accordingly, the OSHA regime structures the relationships between
employers and employees by ensuring the foundational status of employees’
right to safety and health.125 These deviations from the common law of torts
do not imply that the OSHA regime is divorced from private law’s relational
focus. Rather, they mean that even though its form is regulatory, this regime
is in tune—in fact, more in tune than its adjudicatory counterpart—with a
focus on what relational justice requires.126
122
See Dagan & Dorfman, Just Relationships, supra note 50, at 1436–37 (noting the continued
applicability of traditional legal doctrines—like injunctive relief and punitive damages—in workers’
compensation cases, which count as relationally just in terms of the employer-employee interaction).
123
See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OSHA FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL 6-1 (2015),
https://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/Directive_pdf/CPL_02-00-159.pdf
[hereinafter
OSHA
FIELD
OPERATIONS MANUAL] (regarding the General Penalty Policy, noting penalties to employers as incentive
for preventing or correcting violations voluntarily); NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD & CHARLES C. CALDART,
TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE WORKING ENVIRONMENT 458 (rev’d ed., 1996) (discussing the OSH Act’s
goal in providing safe workplaces, by establishing and enforcing standard governing the work
environment).
124
The qualified language of the text derives from the fact that a comparative institutional analysis
may show that an ex post workers’ compensation (or tort) approach is in fact more effective in securing
employees’ fundamental right to safety and health.
125
See CHARLES NOBLE, LIBERALISM AT WORK: THE RISE AND FALL OF OSHA 94 (1986)
(“[OSHA] promised all workers a minimum level of health and safety regardless of the extent to which
they were politically and economically organized, their income, or their market position.”).
126
This does not imply, of course, that OSHA works perfectly. Indeed, like many (most) other
complex bureaucracies, it suffers both from delays and from distortions, due to the influence of interest
groups. See id. at 205 (discussing the failure of OSHA, including susceptibility to business groups’
mobilization); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-330, WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH:
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This relational perspective is key to important aspects of both the
substance and the form of the OSHA regime. It is most clearly manifested
substantively in OSHA’s prescription of feasible risk reduction.127 OSHA
“requires the elimination of ‘significant’ risks, when [those risks] can be
eliminated without threatening the long-run health of the activity to which
the risks belong.”128 As Gregory Keating explains, such feasibility analysis
“looks to achieve the lowest level of risk practically”—that is:
technologically and economically—“attainable, not the level of risk that
minimizes the combined costs of injuries and their prevention.”129 This
analysis renders intelligible what Sunstein and other spokespersons of the
conventional accounts of regulatory theory find so puzzling.130 Indeed,
OSHA’s feasibility test makes perfect relational sense. Private law’s
normative underpinnings of reciprocal respect for self-determination and
substantive equality entail an asymmetrical treatment of physical harms and
financial costs.131 This means that where “the essential conditions of
effective agency”132 of the employees are at stake, risk creators should
indeed be required to “press precaution beyond the point of marginal
cost-justifiability.”133
Another way to view this situation is to shift attention momentarily away
from an individualized risk creating decision. What is at stake is a regime
level rule, a baseline of the interpersonal interaction between employers and
employees. OSHA’s baseline of relational justice reflects a commitment
regarding what kinds of considerations can actually enter the aggregate

MULTIPLE CHALLENGES LENGTHEN OSHA’S STANDARD SETTING 4, 7–9, 12, 37–38 (2012),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589825.pdf (noting the involvement of various interest groups in the
rulemaking process, and reporting on the protracted time periods of developing and issuing new or
updated health and safety standards).
127
29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2012) (“The Secretary . . . shall set the standard which most adequately
assures, to the extent feasible . . . that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional
capacity . . . .”). There are, to be sure, also aggregative concerns that affect OSHA’s regime, as—for
example—where it incorporates concerns of the economic burden on small businesses. See Occupational
Safety & Health Admin., Small Business, DEP’T LAB., https://www.osha.gov/smallbusiness/ (last visited
Oct. 8, 2019) (demonstrating availability of resources and information, specifically for small business
employers).
128
Gregory C. Keating, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis the Only Game in Town?, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 195,
231, 233 (2018).
129
Id. at 231.
130
See Masur & Posner, supra note 10, at 658, 668, 679, 704, 706-07, 709; Sunstein, supra note
11, at 1410–11.
131
See Dagan & Dorfman, Just Relationships, supra note 50, at 1397, 1418, 1424, 1432 (contrasting
private law’s valuing of self-determination and substantive equality that implies the asymmetrical
treatment of physical harms and financial costs with their symmetrical treatment under the economic
analysis of law).
132
Keating, supra note 128, at 200.
133
Dov Waisman, Reasonable Precaution for the Individual, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 653, 670
(2014).

343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd 105

7/28/20 10:47 AM

634

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:2

welfarist analysis in the first place;134 and it also recognizes that relational
justice need not imply that concerns of general welfare are irrelevant. This
is why its feasibility requirement does not apply to insignificant risk: such a
“background level of risk” is “worth bearing,” as Keating notes, because
eliminating all discernible risk “requires the elimination of all discernible
activity,” which would be “a cure worse than the disease it treats.”135
Furthermore, although OSHA does not establish a regime of one-to-one
litigation,136 the relational foundation of the OSHA regime can easily be
traced in many features of its form. OSHA defines its “general” mission as
the assurance of “safe and healthful conditions for working men and
women,” where its own role is one of “setting and enforcing standards and
providing training, outreach, education and compliance assistance,” while
“employers are responsible for providing a safe and healthful workplace for
their workers.”137 This division of labor is not one whereby the state
commandeers the support of employers to enhance its public goals; rather,
it rests on the typical private law relational logic:138 “Because employers
control the conditions of employment, the onus of protecting workers from
occupational disease and injury was to rest with them as well.”139
Indeed, as the “general duty” clause of the OSH Act prescribes, each
employer is obligated “to furnish to each of his employees employment and
a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are
causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his
employees.”140 This relational emphasis accounts for the rough
correspondence between the list of employers’ responsibilities and that of
134
A capacious view of cost benefit analysis would seek to limit this type of consideration to a bare
minimum, insisting that only harms/benefits that are unquantifiable in principle escape the analysis.
Unsurprisingly, such a view often accords with the (philosophically dubious) claim that values such as
“equity” or “dignity” are quantifiable in principle. For an analysis that usefully distinguishes between
what may be impossible and what is merely difficult to quantify, see Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner,
Unquantified Benefits and the Problem of Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 104–
08 (2016).
135
Keating, supra note 128, at 248–49.
136
To be sure, complaints by workers or their representatives are important triggers for inspections,
in which case they also have some rights of participation and information. See, e.g., OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ALL ABOUT OSHA 16 (2018),
https://www.osha.gov/publications/all_about_osha.pdf [hereinafter ALL ABOUT OSHA] (“Workers only
have the right to challenge the deadline by which a problem must be resolved.”). But the process is
administrative and “[w]hen an inspector finds violations of OSHA standards or serious hazards, OSHA
may issue citations and fines. A citation includes methods an employer may use to fix a problem and the
date by when the corrective actions must be completed.” Id.; see also OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH
ADMIN., WORKERS’ RIGHTS 13 (2014), https://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3021.pdf (describing
OSHA protocol for violations).
137
ALL ABOUT OSHA, supra note 136, at 4.
138
ASHFORD & CALDART, supra note 123, at 184.
139
Id. at 92. See also PAUL A. ERICKSON, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND
SAFETY 3 (1st ed.1996).
140
29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2012).
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employees’ rights, as well as for the fact that the OSHA regime does not
cover self-employed workers.141
In addition, the pursuit of relational justice is not limited to the substance
of its safety standards. OSHA’s focus on constructing just workplace
relationships implicates the way it complies with the Administrative
Procedure Act’s requirement of stakeholders’ participation in its rulemaking
procedure:142 both employers and labor representatives may recommend that
OSHA initiate standards,143 and, in any event, OSHA conducts public
hearings or roundtables in which representatives of both parties can provide
their input.144 Furthermore, two representatives of each side sit on the
National Advisory Committee on Occupational Safety and Health
(NACOSH), which advises the secretaries of labor and health and human
services on occupational safety and health programs and policies.145
The connection between process considerations and relational justice is
complex, and the democratizing element of OSHA’s advisory committee
may be seen as a mediating feature. On the one hand, if one believed that
relational justice could be deduced from pure reason, the advisory board
could comprise a single philosopher. But under modern industrial
conditions, safety policy seems more like a hybrid category where a range
of arrangements that might accord with relational justice merit
consideration. Reasoning about those arrangements is not a mere exercise in
expressing preference or exerting interest group power, but situated
perspectives will make a difference for choices. Under these conditions,
allowing some significant representation is a step toward allowing
participants to understand the system as one of their own authorship. This is
also part of the infrastructure of just relations.
The same relational justice rationale also explains “OSHA’s priority
system for conducting inspections” which “is designed to allocate available
OSHA resources as effectively as possible to ensure that maximum feasible
protection is provided to working men and women.”146 It also nicely
explains, indeed justifies, OSHA’s authority to seek a restraining order if it
finds “conditions or practices” which “could reasonably be expected to
cause death or serious physical harm before normal enforcement procedures
141

ALL ABOUT OSHA, supra note 136, at 8–10.
5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018).
143
ALL ABOUT OSHA, supra note 136, at 12.
144
Id. at 12–13.
145
National Advisory Committee on Occupational Safety & Health, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &
HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.osha.gov/dop/nacosh/nacosh.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2019).
146
OSHA FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 123. Specifically, inspections are initiated
without advance notice, and based on the following priorities: imminent danger, catastrophes, worker
complaints and referrals, and follow-up inspections. See Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(Aug.
2016),
(OSHA)
Inspections,
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN.
https://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/data_General_Facts/factsheet-inspections.pdf.
142
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could eliminate the hazard.”147 Perhaps the starkest example of this rationale
is the regulation providing workers a right to refuse hazardous work if “the
condition clearly presents a risk of death or serious physical harm, there is
not sufficient time for OSHA to inspect, and, where possible, a worker has
brought the condition to the attention of the employer.”148 While its
applications are not necessarily straightforward, the principle is a clear case
of taking a particular activity off the bargaining table. In that sense, it
establishes a relational justice baseline that structures the rest of the parties’
interaction.
Finally, the relational rationale underpins OSHA’s outreach priorities,
that is: its focus on “vulnerable, hard-to-reach workers in dangerous jobs to
enhance their knowledge about their rights and the hazards they face” as well
as on “temporary workers” and “limited English proficiency workers—a
population that typically experiences a higher rate of injuries, illnesses, and
fatalities in the workplace.”149 OSHA’s mission of constructing just
workplace relationships is also clear from the extension of its reach to
foreign workers who are thereby also encouraged “to exercise their rights
under occupational safety and health laws.”150 Outreach has rarely been the
focus of scholars dealing with OSHA.151 It is, however, a telling example for
our claim. When people affected by the ground rules of interaction are
unaware of their rights, the very basis of just relationships is threatened.
Outreach is crucial for establishing the basic conditions for just work
relationships. Further, it is particularly inaccessible to courts; it may be a
byproduct of sensational litigation now and then, but it cannot be
systematically pursued except by an administrative agency. OSHA’s
147

ASHFORD & CALDART, supra note 123, at 96.
ALL ABOUT OSHA, supra note 136, at 20. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 1 (1980)
(supporting OSHA’s attempt to force accommodation of workplace conditions to workers’ known
susceptibilities); ASHFORD & CALDART, supra note 123, at 425–26, 441 (discussing “employees who
face exclusion from the workplace . . . because of their presumed susceptibility to health hazards known
to be present in the workplace”).
149
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, STRATEGIC PLAN, FISCAL YEARS 2014–2018, at 31, 33–34,
https://archive.org/details/Department-of-Labor-Strategic-Plan-2014-2018 (last visited Oct. 22, 2019).
150
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., LETTER OF ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR OF THE
UNITED STATES AND THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PHILIPPINES CONCERNING
WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH PROTECTIONS APPLICABLE TO FILIPINO WORKERS IN THE UNITED
STATES 1 (2012), https://www.osha.gov/international/docs/loa_philippines.pdf. OSHA signed similar
agreements with Mexico, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, The Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, The Philippines, and China. OSHA International, OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.osha.gov/international/index.html [https://perma.cc/YHA7F78Y] (last visited Mar. 25, 2020). These agreements contain no commitments of the other countries
regarding American workers. They thus lack any statist rationale and can best be explained as a
manifestation of the foreign workers’ interpersonal human rights. See generally Hanoch Dagan & Avihay
Dorfman, Interpersonal Human Rights, 51 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 361 (2018).
151
For the exception that proves the rule, see Jayesh M. Rathod, Immigrant Labor and the
Occupational Safety and Health Regime, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 479 (2009).
148
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outreach regime recognizes the importance of creating the conditions for just
relationships by taking on the responsibility for generating an informed
workforce.
3. CFPB
Our second example, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB), was only recently established as part of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act
reforms of the financial services regulatory system152 (and currently
occupies some news headlines).153 Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act creates the
CFPB within the Federal Reserve System and assigns to it “rulemaking,
enforcement, and supervisory powers over many consumer financial
products and services, as well as the entities that sell them.”154
The CFPB is a perfect example for our purposes because the financial
institutions over which it has authority were actually regulated and
supervised prior to its establishment. But both the attention and the expertise
of the banking regulators, who had the statutory powers to protect consumers
at that time, were focused on their other mission, which they perceived to be
primary,155 namely “ensuring that institutions are managed in a safe and
sound manner so as to maintain profitability and avoid failure.”156 Safety and
soundness regulation is of course justified from the perspective of the
general welfare. However, the dominance of this public perspective implied
the “subordination of consumer protection to bank profitability,” which
meant that except in the “most egregious” cases, regulators tended to look
favorably upon even “unfair, deceptive, and abusive” bank practices as long
152
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), 12 U.S.C. §
5491 (2012).
153
See Ian Wren, Clash for Control of Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Heads to Court,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/12/601965298/legal-battle-over-whoruns-consumer-bureau-continues (describing the 2018 controversy over who got to run the CFPB).
154
DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42572, THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION
BUREAU
(CFPB):
A
LEGAL
ANALYSIS
1
(2014),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42572.pdf. To be sure, with respect to large depository institutions,
the CFPB now has the primary consumer compliance supervisory, enforcement, and rulemaking
authorities. Regarding smaller ones, the prudential banking regulators hold a significant portion of the
supervisory and enforcement powers. On the other hand, the CFPB may also regulate nondepository
financial institutions: providers of private student loans; providers of payday loans; entities that engage
in mortgage-related activities; and other institutions, which it considers to be large participants in a
consumer financial market or ones that engage in conduct that pose risks with regard to the provision of
consumer financial products or services. Id. at 13, 16.
155
See Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 330–31 (2013) (describing how the primary motivation of bank regulators was
profitability over protecting consumers).
156
CARPENTER, supra note 154, at 2. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) “did have a consumer
focus,” but it had no “deep expertise in consumer finance.” Id. at 8; Levitin, supra note 155, at 331.
Furthermore, its statutory authority “prevented it from conducting ex ante supervision of nondepositories
and from regulating depositories altogether.” CARPENTER, supra note 154, at 8.
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as they were indeed profitable.157 This failure, which triggered the
establishment of the CFPB,158 can be interpreted simply as mistaken
application of welfarist criteria by underestimating costs that are widely
spread; and it was probably also that. But it also meant that prior to the
CFPB, there was no room to consider concerns of relational injustice.
The CFPB, to be sure, does not (and should not) eliminate the obvious
significance of public concerns in the regulation of financial institutions.159
But it does give center stage to relational considerations,160 and in this
respect it is similar to OSHA. Although its focus is on financial products,
rather than health and safety, and its beneficiaries are consumers,161 rather
than workers, its conceptual starting point is very close to OSHA’s: the
inadequacy of the traditional adjudicatory means—the tort and contract suits
that remain available—for the horizontal task of consumer financial
protection. These traditional means are especially constricted given the
“procedural limitations on class actions coupled with the expanded use of
binding mandatory arbitration.”162
Indeed, the foundation of the CFPB was driven by the insight that sellers
of financial products “have learned to exploit . . . consumers in ways that put
[their] economic security at risk,” and that a structural solution to this
predicament requires “the creation of a single regulatory body that [is]
responsible for evaluating the safety of consumer credit products and
policing any features that are designed to trick, trap, or otherwise fool the
consumers that use them.”163 As the CFPB declares in its website, “[t]he
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is a U.S. government agency that
makes sure banks, lenders, and other financial companies treat you fairly.”164
157

Levitin, supra note 155, at 331; see also CARPENTER, supra note 154, at 2 (noting the public
perspective prior to the CFP Act).
158
This was not the only flaw in the pre-CFPB consumer financial protection regime. Another
important problem was “the diffusion of regulatory responsibility [that] created regulatory arbitrage
opportunities that fueled a race to the bottom.” Levitin, supra note 155, at 329.
159
Notably, the establishment of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), and its authority
to veto a CFPB regulation if it unduly risks the safety and soundness of the U.S. financial or banking
system, are aimed exactly at ensuring these aggregative concerns. CARPENTER, supra note 154, at 22;
Levitin, supra note 155, at 353.
160
Cf. SINGER, supra note 115, at 92 (“We choose laws that set the minimum standards for market
relationships.”).
161
The proposition of the text should not be read to imply that there are no remaining difficulties.
One particularly important difficulty in our context is that the CFPB is quite vague as to whether its goal
is to improve consumer financial outcomes, improve consumer welfare, or empower consumers. See
Talia B. Gillis, Putting Disclosure to the Test: Toward Better Evidence-Based Policy, 28 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 31, 39–40 (2015).
162
Levitin, supra note 155, at 334.
163
Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2008)
(alteration in original).
164
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov (last visited Oct. 8,
2019) (alteration in original).
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This role is indeed central to CFPB rulemaking activity, which relies on
a set of eighteen preexisting federal statutes—including the Truth in Lending
Act, the Truth in Savings Act, the Fair Credit Billing Act, and the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.165 Authority over those acts has been transferred to
the CFPB from several other regulators.166 In addition, the Bureau enjoys an
“organic authority under the Consumer Financial Protection Act,” which
deals with “defining certain acts and practices as unfair, deceptive, or
abusive; mandating disclosures; requiring registration of certain non-banks;
and restricting predispute arbitration.”167
As might be expected, some of the CFPB’s rules—such as the
prescription that “[d]eception is not limited to situations in which a
consumer has already been misled,” but rather covers also acts or practices
which are “likely to mislead consumers”168—can be accounted for from both
an aggregative and an interpersonal perspective. The significance of this rule
to the interpersonal perspective is, of course, in supplementing the ex post
adjudicatory model with a regulation that may more effectively prevent the
consumer’s predicament. But other rules seem to focus on the relational
wrong.169
Thus, the CFPB defines an act or practice as abusive—a category that is
the creation of the Dodd-Frank Act—if it “materially interferes with the
ability of a consumer to understand a term or condition of a consumer
financial product or service” or if it “takes unreasonable advantage” of the
consumer’s “lack of understanding . . . of the material risks, costs, or
conditions of the product or service,” her “inability” to protect her “interests
. . . in selecting or using a consumer financial product or service,” or her
“reasonable reliance” on an intermediary “to act in the interests of the
consumer.”170 A similar (indeed, more obvious) relational justice rationale
165

See Levitin, supra note 155, at 344 (listing consumer laws relied upon by CFPB).
CARPENTER, supra note 154, at 9; Levitin, supra note 155, at 330, 344.
167
Levitin, supra note 155, at 344 (citations omitted).
168
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL 5 (2012)
[hereinafter CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL], http://files.consumerfinance.gov/
f/201210_cfpb_supervision-and-examination-manual-v2.pdf (emphasis in original). CFPB’s
interpretation is based on FED. TRADE COMM’N, POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION (1983),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/410531/831014deceptionstmt.pdf.
169
The cautious language of the text is deliberate. We do not imply that aggregative concerns are
irrelevant even in these contexts. Indeed, insofar as its rulemaking—as opposed to supervisory and
enforcement—activity is concerned, the CFPB is obligated to take into account net benefit (or cost
effectiveness) as one of its considerations. See Levitin, supra note 155, at 352–53 (discussing CFPB
cost-benefit analysis requirements); Howell E. Jackson & Paul Rothstein, Cost Benefit Analysis in
Consumer Protection Regulation 29 (2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). Furthermore,
at times the CFPB may be unsuccessful in its attempt to vindicate relational justice, as the recent
congressional resolution canceling its Arbitration Agreements Rule demonstrates. New Protections
FIN.
PROTECTION
BUREAU,
Against
Mandatory
Arbitration,
CONSUMER
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/arbitration-rule/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2020).
170
12 U.S.C. § 5531(d) (2012).
166
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underlies the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)171—one of the sources
of the CFPB’s transferred powers—that authorizes the CFPB to ensure that
creditors do not “discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any
aspect of a credit transaction . . . on the basis of race, color, religion, national
origin, sex or marital status, or age . . . .”172
CFPB’s relational focus is no less significant insofar as its supervision,
enforcement, and education activities are concerned. Thus, unlike the
Federal Trade Commission, which dealt with these matters prior to its
establishment, complaints to the CFPB do not serve merely as a means to
“detect patterns of wrong-doing.”173 Rather, they are taken seriously as such,
so that “companies are expected to close all but the most complicated
complaints within 60 days.”174 Moreover, the CFPB’s supervision priorities
also reflect a focus on risk to consumers,175 and the very same focus is also
the first principle guiding its supervisory process.176
CFPB’s enforcement authority (via litigation in a federal district court
or administrative adjudication before an administrative law judge)177 may
yield a wide-ranging set of remedies, many of them—such as refund of
money, return of real property, and payment of damages—follow the
traditional forms of redress to the pertinent victims.178 The recent Wells
Fargo scandal supplies an excellent case in point. Wells Fargo Bank, one of
the biggest banks in the United States, secretly opened two million
unauthorized accounts, transferred funds from consumers’ accounts without
171

15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2006).
Id. On anti-discrimination laws as means of relational justice, see infra note 215 and
accompanying text.
173
Solving
Consumer
Problems,
FED.
TRADE
COMMISSION
(July
2012),
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0228-solving-consumer-problems (emphasis added).
174
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Monthly Complaints Snapshot Spotlights Bank Account
and Service Complaints, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Aug. 30, 2016),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-monthlycomplaints-snapshot-spotlights-bank-account-and-service-complaints/.
175
See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, THE CFPB STRATEGIC PLAN, BUDGET, AND
PERFORMANCE
PLAN
AND
REPORT
(2016),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/
201602_cfpb_report_strategic-plan-budget-and-performance-plan_FY2016.pdf (describing consumerfocused plan and strategy).
176
CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 168, at Examinations 3 (other
principles described are that it should be data driven and consistent). Consumer complaints are important
triggers for CFPB examinations and enforcement (as well as rulemaking). Id. Other than that, CFPB’s
complaint process is designed to help the consumer and the financial entity reach a just settlement. See
generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER RESPONSE ANNUAL REPORT JANUARY 1 –
DECEMBER 31, 2015 (2016), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201604_cfpb_consumer-responseannual-report-2015.pdf (using, overall, consumer-focused language).
177
See Levitin, supra note 155, at 357–58 (describing remedies for violation of consumer financial
law).
178
Others—such as public notification regarding the violation and limits on the activities or
functions of the person against whom the action is brought—are more public in nature. See CFPB
SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 168, at Overview 7 (providing a full list).
172
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consent, and often racked up fees and charges in the process.179 An
investigation by the CFPB led to a $100 million fine,180 in addition to
penalties to the Office of the Comptroller of Currency and the City of Los
Angeles.181 Further, Wells Fargo was forced to pay restitution to any of its
customers who were charged unauthorized fees.182
The civil monetary penalty is a particularly instructive regulatory tool
for CFPB’s horizontal task of ensuring just outcomes in particular cases:
these penalties—as of the end of September 2017 the Bureau collected some
$566 million183—must be deposited into the Consumer Financial Civil
Penalty Fund, where they are “pooled” and used primarily for compensating
“victims who haven’t received full compensation for their harm through
redress paid by the defendant in their case.”184
Finally, analogously to OSHA, the CFPB focuses its efforts of
improving consumers’ financial capability by “addressing the unique
financial challenges faced by four specific populations”: students and young
consumers, the elderly, service members, and low-income and economically
vulnerable consumers.185 The CFPB’s creation in the wake of the global
financial crisis has given it something of a bully pulpit. High profile
investigations often accompanied by congressional hearings (as in the case
of Wells Fargo, and previously with other high-profile cases of banking
impropriety) allow the CFPB to educate the public through publicity. The
Bureau creates salience for the norms of fair banking, helping to bring
consumers of financial products closer to an awareness of their rights that
could form the substrate of a just banking relationship.
***
These two examples do not exhaust the real-life manifestations of the
hitherto obscured relational dimension of regulatory agencies: there are
additional agencies that are similarly relational in nature and others that are
best characterized in hybrid terms, having significant public law and private
179
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Fines Wells Fargo $100
Million for Widespread Illegal Practice of Secretly Opening Unauthorized Accounts, CFPB NEWSROOM
(Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protectionbureau-fines-wells-fargo-100-million-widespread-illegal-practice-secretly-opening-unauthorizedaccounts/.
180
Id.
181
See L.A. City Attorney, Protecting Consumers - Wells Fargo, L.A. CITY ATT’Y MIKE FEUER,
http://www.lacityattorney.org/allegations-against-wells-fargo (last visited Mar. 25, 2020) (announcing
result of Wells Fargo lawsuit and linking to the Los Angeles Times report).
182
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, supra note 179.
183
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CIVIL PENALTY FUND: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
(2017), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/CPF_FAQ_2017.12.14.pdf.
184
Civil Penalty Fund, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2019).
185
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, THE CFPB STRATEGIC PLAN, BUDGET, AND PERFORMANCE
PLAN AND REPORT, supra note 175, at 5.
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law elements. Analyzing this important subset of the apparatus of the
modern administrative state vindicates the main claim of this Article: that
regulatory theory should follow regulatory practice and think not only in
aggregative terms but also horizontally. Our analysis further generates a
preliminary account of what it means to be a relational regulator: it helps
articulating the normative vocabulary with which such agencies should be
evaluated and distilling a preliminary taxonomy of their characteristic
toolkit.
C. Thinking Horizontally
OSHA and CFPB are only two examples of a significant subset of the
modern administrative apparatus. But they are not outliers. Indeed, the easy
case for horizontally oriented agencies would begin with the agencies that
set default terms of trade for large swaths of standardized commercial
dealing.186 The regulatory apparatus of the modern state is heavily
implicated in regulating interpersonal relationships. Because their actions
shape interpersonal relations, these agencies should be (and happily, often
are) thinking horizontally.
One manifestation of this emphasis is straightforward and can be briefly
stated despite the minimal attention we have given it thus far. Regulators
with private law functions take individual complaints seriously,187 even
though most of them also have proactive enforcement powers.188 The
186

For just one example, consider the role of the Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural
Marketing Service. The Agency establishes quality grading and conducts inspections dealing with safety,
but is also responsible for “establishing and enforcing a code of fair business practices and . . . helping
companies resolve business disputes” under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act. Perishable
Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA), U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., https://www.ams.usda.gov/rulesregulations/paca (last visited Oct. 8, 2019). Examples like this could be multiplied.
187
Again, an illustrative indication from the Department of Agriculture:
The PACA Division, which is part of USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service
(AMS), regulates fair trading practices of produce businesses that are operating
subject to PACA including buyers, sellers, commission merchants, dealers and
brokers within the fruit and vegetable industry. In the past three years, USDA resolved
approximately 3,500 PACA claims involving more than $58 million. Our experts also
assisted more than 8,000 callers with issues valued at approximately $140 million.
These are just two examples of how USDA continues to support the fruit and
vegetable industry.
USDA Files Action Against K & A Produce in New York for PACA Violations, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. (Apr.
12, 2017, 11:30 AM), https://www.ams.usda.gov/press-release/usda-files-action-against-k-producenew-york-paca-violations. Some say that these agencies take complaints too seriously. See, e.g., Nancy
M. Modesitt, Reinventing the EEOC, 63 SMU L. REV. 1237, 1263 (2010) (proposing to redefine the
EEOC’s role so that it only investigates and litigates significant claims, reducing the overall number of
discrimination complaints the Agency processes).
188
The exception to this rule is the National Labor Relations Bureau (NLRB), whose proceedings
must “originate with the filing of charges or petitions by employees, labor unions, employers or other
private parties.” NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., NLRB STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2014 – FY 2018, at 5

343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd 114

7/28/20 10:47 AM

REGULATORY THEORY

2020]

643

implications of this proposition vary: the proceedings these “horizontal
agencies” offer for dealing with complaints can either serve as (partial)
substitutes to private lawsuits, or run in parallel to potential such lawsuits.189
Most (but not all) of these agencies prefer to settle disputes through an
agreement between the parties involved, namely: via mediation, facilitation,
conciliation, or in an informal resolution.190 These differences
notwithstanding, the simple point is that when a significant part of an
agency’s role is to secure relational justice, it naturally aspires to provide
satisfactory responses to relational wrongs.191
(2014),
https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-1709/NLRB%20
Strategic%20Plan%20FY2014-18.pdf.
189
See, e.g., Filing a Lawsuit, U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY & EMP. COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/lawsuit.cfm (last visited Oct. 8, 2019) (noting that if an individual
plans to file a federal lawsuit “alleging discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex (including
pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, age (40 or older), disability, genetic
information or retaliation, [the individual] first [has] to file a charge with the EEOC”); U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, FAQS ABOUT RETIREMENT PLANS AND ERISA, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/about-ebsa/our-activities/resourcecenter/faqs/retirement-plans-and-erisa-for-workers.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2019) (“The Department of
Labor enforces the law by informally resolving benefit disputes, conducting investigations, and seeking
correction of violations of the law, including bringing lawsuits when necessary.”).
190
See What You Can Expect After You File a Charge, U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY & EMP.
COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/process.cfm (last visited Oct. 8, 2019) (explaining the
pre-investigation mediation process); Investigate Charges, NAT’L LAB. RELATIONS BD.,
https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/investigate-charges (last visited Oct. 8, 2019) (describing how NLRB
makes “every effort to facilitate a settlement between parties” if an investigation finds evidence to support
a charge); U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., LEARN ABOUT THE FHEO COMPLAINT AND
INVESTIGATION PROCESS, https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/fair_housing
_equal_opp/enforcement/conciliations (last visited Oct. 8, 2019) (describing how throughout the
investigation the FHEO “will make efforts to help the parties reach an agreement”); What We Do, U.S.
DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/about-us/what-we-do (last visited Oct. 8,
2019) (“EBSA’s goal in responding to requests for interpretations and other rulings is to facilitate
compliance with ERISA, and the department’s regulations through useful and timely interpretive
guidance to plan participants, plan sponsors and other members of the employee benefits community.”).
But see U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., WORKERS’ RIGHTS 3–4, 16
(2017) https://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3021.pdf (indicating OSHA is the clear exception, where
mutual agreement is less important due to the dimension it regulates—safety and health—and there are
some working environments that—even if workers agree to them—are too dangerous and would be
prohibited by the Agency). As the booklet explains to workers:
If you believe working conditions are unsafe or unhealthful, we recommend that you
bring the conditions to your employer’s attention, if possible. You may file a
complaint with OSHA concerning a hazardous working condition at any time.
However, you should not leave the worksite merely because you have filed a
complaint. If the condition clearly presents a risk of death or serious physical harm,
there is not sufficient time for OSHA to inspect, and, where possible, you have
brought the condition to the attention of your employer, you may have a legal right to
refuse to work in a situation in which you would be exposed to the hazard.
Id. at 16.

191
A particularly clear manifestation of this commitment transpires where an agency seeks
temporary relief in order to prevent an interpersonal irreparable harm. See supra text accompanying note
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This is of course hardly surprising. What may seem more surprising—
at least to theorists who think about the administrative state from the
dominant public law paradigm—is the continuity between the common law
and these horizontal agencies. Even where they set up policies—by
prescribing rules or setting up priorities for their supervision and
enforcement efforts—these agencies are profoundly guided by relational
considerations, which is of course what can be expected given their
significant role in shaping important categories of interpersonal
relationships.192 Indeed, the relational perspective typifies both the form and
the substance of the norms horizontal agencies produce and follow as well
as their characteristic toolkit of techniques.
Regulatory agencies are often central in creating or maintaining the
baseline entitlements that structure relationships.193 While courts often
engage in such baseline setting as a byproduct of particularistic litigation,
agencies do this work overtly in a manner more exposed to public
accountability. Their rules are not side effects of settling disputes, but rather
geared directly to setting the foundations of relationships.194 Importantly,
administrative agencies are positioned to make structural decisions that
courts would have difficulty formulating. In this sense, agencies have a
wider scope in setting up the infrastructure of just relations, which courts
typically address interstitially.
After considering a range of agency operations, we are willing to hazard
a preliminary classification of three modes of horizontal agency. A first
mode of relational regulation is often oriented towards bringing participants
into a market, which resembles that of economic models. Whenever
regulators engage in education initiatives, publicize the rights of consumers
or workers,195 or force firms to make information available to their

147 (discussing OSHA’s approach). See also, e.g., File a Complaint: Types of Complaints Investigated
by FHEO, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URBAN DEV., https://www.hud.gov/program_
offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/online-complaint#_Types_of_Complaints (last visited Oct. 8, 2019).
192
See supra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing how the OSHA “Hazard Communication
Standard” and the SEC’s “Strategic Goal 3” are fundamentally about forcing exchanges of information
between individuals).
193
See supra text accompanying note 7 (introducing the concept of “regulatory contribution to the
infrastructure of interpersonal interaction”).
194
See supra notes 160–63 and accompanying text (giving examples of how the EEOC, EBSA,
NLRB, FHEO, and OSHA can set such foundations).
195
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, STRATEGIC PLAN FISCAL YEARS 2014-2018, at 12–13,
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/documents/agencies/osec/stratplan/fy2014-2018strategicplan.pdf
(last visited Mar. 25, 2020) (describing how the Department is securing “safe and healthy workplaces,
particularly in high-risk industries,” and improving “health benefits and retirement security for all
workers” through OSHA and EBSA, respectively); Serving Economically Vulnerable Consumers,
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/empowerment/ (last visited
Oct. 8, 2019).
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employees or trading partners,196 the agencies engage in a type of
empowerment. But this is an empowerment only to participate in a market
with full information, without affecting its content.197
In a second mode of horizontal agency, the regulatory work changes the
baseline in order to take certain contracting options off the table.198 When
regulators set minimum terms for interaction, they override (if the
regulations have any bite) some party preferences, making at least some
voluntary transactions unavailable (e.g., employment below safety
standards).199 Here, the motivations may be framed in various terms; we
have argued that a normative commitment to just interpersonal relationships
is often the proper motivating force. Indeed, we think that there is a
continuity between the statutory regimes on which we focus in these pages
and classical common law doctrines like misrepresentation, mistake, duress,
undue influence, and unconscionability.200
Finally, the third mode of agency action lies somewhere in between the
first two: it entails establishing mechanisms for participation in setting the
terms of trade (especially employment). These mechanisms do not mandate
particular minimum standards, but they do set up a bargaining venue that
guarantees some level of representation of different interests, whose
significance may be either intrinsic or instrumental (that is: as a means to
affect the parties’ consensual equilibrium without directly prohibiting
certain outcomes).201

196
See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FISCAL YEARS 2014-2018, at 37,
https://www.sec.gov/about/sec-strategic-plan-2014-2018.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2020) (citing
“Strategic Goal 3” as “Facilitat[ing] Access to the Information Investors Need to Make Informed
Investment Decisions”); Hazard Communication Guidelines for Compliance, U.S. DEP’T LAB.,
https://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3111.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2019) (“OSHA’s Hazard
Communication Standard (HCS) is based on a simple concept—that employees have both a need and a
right to know the hazards and identities of the chemicals they are exposed to when working.”).
197
Disclosure, outreach, and publicity are examples. The goal in these instances is to prevent the
type of exploitation liable to occur when contractors are faced by severe information asymmetries. For
some analysts, these types of agency action may be viewed rather directly as corrections of market
failures. Thus, while we have argued that their basis is best understood in the framework of relational
justice, we recognize that there is a great deal of potential overlap between this consideration and an
aggregative efficiency perspective.
198
See SINGER, supra note 115, at 2, 19–20, 23–24, 47, 65, 68, 72, 155, 182.
199
See, e.g., ASHFORD & CALDART, supra note 123, at 99–100; see also supra note 189 and
accompanying text.
200
See EMMANUEL VOYIAKIS, PRIVATE LAW AND THE VALUE OF CHOICE 82, 85, 178, 195, 198,
200–01 (2017). This mode raises important concerns of impermissible paternalism and illiberal
normalization, which we cannot address here. See Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Justice for
Contracts § II.B (2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3435781.
201
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78pp (2012) (establishing the Investor Advisory Committee, whose
mission is to present the views and experience of a wide variety of investors and to advise the SEC on
regulatory priorities and practices); National Advisory Committee on Occupational Safety & Health
Charter, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.osha.gov/dop/nacosh/nacosh.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2019).
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As may be expected, the relational form––namely: the correspondence
between the responsibility of the regulated party and the rights of the
agency’s class of beneficiaries––is particularly conspicuous with agencies
that regulate, and thus participate in constructing, the employment
relationship.202 We have mentioned this feature while describing OSHA,203
but it appears elsewhere also.204 Indeed, it is even more conspicuous
regarding the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), given the correlative
relationships between its lists of employees’ rights and of employers’
obligations.
Employees have the right to join together to advance their interests as
employees and to unionize and be represented by a union of their choice.205
Correspondingly, it is unlawful for an employer to interfere with, restrain,
or coerce employees in the exercise of these rights or to discourage (or
encourage) union activities or sympathies.206 The attention to maintaining
just work relationships makes sense of employers’ legal duty to bargain in
good faith with their employees’ representative and to sign any collective
bargaining agreement that has been reached. While the good faith standard
does not mandate the content of the agreement, it announces, informs, and
backs up a vision of relationships of mutual duty.207
202
The reason why it is not surprising is threefold: first, work is one of the core horizontal
relationships in modern societies; second, the fact that the work relationship involves some entitlement
of one person over another’s labor power makes it a particularly challenging arena for a legal system that
seeks to ensure just relationships; finally, the categories of employers and employees are also distinctive
sociological categories, which means that the pursuit of relational justice in this type of relationship
largely overlaps the pursuit of democratic equality.
203
See supra text accompanying note 141.
204
See, e.g., Employee Rights, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/smallbusiness/checklists/employee_rights.cfm (last visited Oct. 8,
2019); Small Business Requirements, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/smallbusiness/requirements.cfm (last visited Oct. 8, 2019). This
emphasis on the relational form of the parties’ rights and obligations is not the only horizontal common
denominator of agencies that deal with the employment relationships. They also––unsurprisingly given
their horizontal, as opposed to vertical, or statist, emphasis––tend to extend their coverage to vulnerable
foreign workers. We mentioned this feature while describing OSHA. See supra text accompanying note
150. It also applies to both the NLRB and the EEOC. See Collaboration with Foreign Embassies, NAT’L
LAB. RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/fact-sheets/collaboration-foreignembassies (last visited Oct. 8, 2019); Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Between the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Mexican States,
EQUAL
EMP.
OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/
U.S.
mous/eeoc_mexico_mou.cfm (last visited Oct. 8, 2019) (providing examples of how these agencies
extend coverage to foreign workers).
205
Employee Rights, NAT’L LAB. RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-weprotect/employee-rights (last visited Oct. 8, 2019).
206
Employer/Union Rights and Obligations, NAT’L LAB. RELATIONS BOARD,
https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/rights/employer-union-rights-and-obligations (last visited Oct.
8, 2019).
207
See Employee Rights, NAT’L LAB. RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-weprotect/employee-rights (last visited Oct. 8, 2019); Employer/Union Rights and Obligations, NAT’L LAB.
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Even more important for our purposes is that the interpersonal focus of
horizontal agencies affects their actual operation. It explains, and indeed
justifies, their priorities;208 and it underlies some of their foundational
substantive norms. Recall that the touchstone of OSHA’s regime––its
feasibility test––is best understood as the entailment of private law’s typical
commitment to relational justice.209 The same commitment underlies, as we
have also seen, the CFPB’s expansive understanding of abusive practices
and its authority to ensure that credit applicants do not suffer
discrimination.210 And again, OSHA and CFPB are representative of a much
larger family of horizontally oriented agencies, which participate in the
construction of the most fundamental rights and obligations of important
types of interpersonal relationships.
This feature is most visible with regard to two major agencies that deal
with discrimination: the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) and the Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity in the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (FHEO). The EEOC,
whose vision is to secure a “respectful and inclusive workplace[] with equal
employment opportunity for all,” enforces “federal laws that make it illegal
to discriminate against a job applicant or an employee,”211 and furthermore
works “to prevent discrimination before it occurs through outreach,
education and technical assistance programs.”212 The FHEO “administers
federal laws and establishes national policies that make sure all Americans
have equal access to the housing of their choice.”213
Discrimination in the context of the workplace and of residential
dwelling is a relational wrong. The public law dimensions of discrimination
as a wrong exist alongside, but do not replace, the interpersonal aspect. As
explained elsewhere, refusing to consider a would-be buyer of a dwelling
merely because of her skin color, for example, fails to respect the individual
on her own terms, in violation of the most fundamental injunction of
relational justice. Buying and renting a dwelling (a major decision of
self-determination) exposes people to discriminatory practices at the hands
of some homeowners and landlords. Thus, regardless of whether the state
takes care of its obligations—in terms of supplying sufficient housing
RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/employerunion-rights-and-obligations (last
visited Oct. 8, 2019) (discussing the issue of the duty to bargain in good faith).
208
See supra text accompanying notes 146, 175 (describing OSHA and CFPB’s priority systems).
209
See supra text accompanying notes 131–33 (describing private law’s valuing of relational
justice).
210
See supra text accompanying notes 170–72 (describing the CFPB’s expansive definition of
abusive practices).
211
About the EEOC: Overview, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 8, 2019).
212
Id.
213
About FHEO, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV., http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/
program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/aboutfheo (last visited Mar. 25, 2020).
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options to all, and sustaining integrative residential communities—private
law, being the law of our interpersonal rights and obligations, must not, and
does not, authorize social relationships that proceed in defiance of the equal
standing and the autonomy of the person subject to discrimination.214 The
same analysis applies of course to the context of the workplace and to other
forms of discrimination.215
It is therefore not surprising that the regulatory apparatus of both the
EEOC and the FHEO is dedicated to reconstructing these two crucial realms
of interpersonal interaction so as to eliminate forms of unjust relationships.
These regulations include both prohibitions and affirmative obligations, and
they are aimed at shaping the pertinent parties’ rights and obligations in a
way that complies with the injunctions of relational justice. The EEOC
guidelines include, along these lines, a presumption that “[p]rohibiting
employees at all times, in the workplace, from speaking their primary
language or the language they speak most comfortably” is discriminatory,216
as well as a requirement, subject to certain exceptions, that employers “make
reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of
an otherwise qualified applicant or employee with a disability” and to “the
religious practices of an employee or prospective employee” (e.g., by way
of creating “a flexible work schedule”).217 Similarly, one FHEO rule
prohibits “imposing different sales prices or rental charges for the sale or
rental of a dwelling upon any person because of race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin,”218 and another prescribes that
it is unlawful to “refuse to make reasonable accommodations in rules,
policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be
necessary to afford a handicapped person equal opportunity to use and enjoy
a dwelling unit, including public and common use areas.”219
We do not deny, of course, the important public law justifications for
these rules. Both workplace and housing integration are crucial components
of any sustainable, let alone viable, democratic ideal of equal citizenship.220
But the importance of these public elements does not erase the relational
significance of discrimination. Appreciating the normative significance of
the horizontal relation is key to articulating the difficulty where these two
dimensions clash, as in cases where discriminatory practices are used in a

214

See Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 50, at 1440.
Id. at 1438–45.
216
29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (2018).
217
29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.9(a) & 1605.2 (2018).
218
24 C.F.R. § 100.60 (2016).
219
24 C.F.R. § 100.204 (2018).
220
See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION chs. 6–7 (2010); JUDITH N.
SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 79–88 (1991).
215
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way that arguably promotes, rather than undermines, integration.221 It is even
more important if it turns out that the public goal is increasingly being
achieved. Thus, it has recently been reported that there is a sharp decline in
residential segregation, which would significantly destabilize some aspects
of the fair housing regime that rely on its integration rationale.222 But even
if this development happily materializes, appreciating the significance of its
other, relational, rationale vindicates the continuous importance of this
regime—and thus of the FHEO. Whereas integration may be underway each
year, according to the most recent HUD survey, “hundreds of thousands of
FHA violations [still] take place,” which means that “[t]he struggle against
discrimination has not yet been won.”223
Finally, as may be expected, the relational focus affects the regulatory
toolkit of horizontal agencies (beyond the obvious impact regarding their
attention to individual complaints noted earlier). Our two case studies
offered a few examples, such as: enhanced stakeholders’ participation in the
rulemaking process;224 the availability of response in cases of imminent or
serious breach;225 the effort to empower the typically vulnerable side to the
relationships, in terms of both enforcement priorities226 and education
engagement227 (including for noncitizens);228 and the availability of

221
See, e.g., United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988) (discussing a
complaint against an owner of a large apartment complex who reserved a number of units exclusively to
white applicants in order to guard against “white flight” and maintain integrated housing conditions).
222
See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Civil Rights in a Desegregating America, 83 U. CHI. L. REV.
1329, 1339 (2016) (noting that there has been a decline in residential segregation, which represents one
of the most important sociological developments in the last half century).
223
Id. at 1375–76.
224
See supra notes 142–45 and accompanying text.
225
See supra note 147 and accompanying text. See also File a Complaint, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING &
URB.
DEV.,
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/
FHLaws/yourrights (last visited Mar. 25, 2020) (explaining the process of filing a complaint if an
individual believes the individual’s rights may have been violated).
226
See supra text accompanying notes 146, 175–76, 178, 196 (explaining how different agencies
use enforcement priorities in empowering vulnerable parties during dispute resolution). See also U.S.
EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2017 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION
29–38 (2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/2017budget.pdf (showing the EEOC’s plan to
implement programs for private sector enforcement).
227
See supra text accompanying note 149 (explaining OSHA’s outreach to vulnerable workers by
educating them about their rights); see also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, STRATEGIC PLAN FISCAL YEARS
2014-2018, at 6, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/documents/agencies/osec/stratplan/fy20142018strategicplan.pdf (explaining how the Department of Labor plans to advance workers’ rights,
particularly for vulnerable workers); U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR
FISCAL YEARS 2012–2016, at 3, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/strategic_plan_12to16.pdf (last
visited Mar. 25, 2020) (demonstrating how EEOC has implemented educational programs to inform
vulnerable employees).
228
See supra text accompanying note 150 (explaining how OSHA has implemented programs
specifically for protecting and informing foreign employees of their rights); see also supra note 204
(examples of other agencies’ approaches to protecting foreign employees).
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remedies—such as OSHA’s self-help and the CFPB’s Civil Penalty
Fund229—which are specifically tailored to the relational task at hand.
CONCLUSION
One goal of this Article is to challenge the conventional wisdom
according to which regulators should be guided solely by the collective
perspective of the public interest (however defined). Prevalent as it is, this
view is descriptively wrong: a significant subset—the other half of
contemporary administrative apparatuses—is best explained according to an
(at times implicit) relational logic that responds to these agencies’
interpersonal tasks. The conventional wisdom is furthermore normatively
misguided: although there are good reasons to associate private law with
private litigation, many contexts of our complex social environment suggest
that supplementing—and sometimes supplanting—private law judges with
private law regulators would better serve the normative commitments
underlying private law.230
Our second purpose is to offer a tentative account of the profile of
relational regulators, namely: of what is entailed by a commitment to think
horizontally. We have no pretense that our account is exhaustive; indeed, we
assume that it is partial and that further research is required to enrich and
refine it as well as to address related topics we haven’t covered here.231 But
we believe the beginnings mapped out here make a first substantial step in a
promising direction.
Part of its promise lies in the “naming” of the relational task of the
existing horizontal agencies.232 Agencies that embrace this characterization
of their task may improve their horizontal performance by consulting the
preliminary relational toolkit we compiled.233 They can also inform
themselves with substantive theories of private law—such as the one we

229

See supra text accompanying notes 148, 183–84 (explaining OSHA’s self-help and the CFPB’s
civil penalty fund).
230
One can imagine a purist theoretical position that laments these features of the modern
administrative state. But this revisionist approach would need to acknowledge the existing horizontal
dimensions, and thus could not purport to offer an account of the regulatory apparatus as we know it.
231
The most immediate substantive issues that come to mind are preemption on the one hand and
implied rights of action on the other hand. Another interesting puzzle is why conventional wisdom
(popular and academic) has relied for so long on the incomplete and thus inadequate basis of public law
values for justification. The puzzle might be one for intellectual historians (and on that level we have
nothing to contribute), but it might also have a conceptual element. That conceptual element could be
related to the challenge of thinking sufficiently abstractly about the conditions for just relations. We leave
this somewhat philosophical reflection for another day.
232
Cf. William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming,
Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 631 (1980) (describing the concept of “naming”).
233
To be sure, in many cases expanding an agency’s tools would require further legislation.
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briefly restated earlier on234—in order to incorporate their more specific
prescriptions into their decisions regarding the areas in which they already
think horizontally.235
Another possible payoff of this effort may come about in the context of
agencies that do not easily fit into our prototypical aggregative or horizontal
agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). These hybrid, or intermediate, agencies
have both aggregative and horizontal features.236 Articulating the pertinent
putative horizontal tasks of agencies of this category can again help optimize
the appropriate means for their realization.237
Finally, appreciating the potential role of agencies in structuring just
interpersonal relationships may justify revisiting the hegemony of the public
law perspectives of some agencies that currently do not share the orientation
toward private law we study in this Article. Indeed, even agencies that are
properly conceptualized as aggregative may well benefit from a
reconsideration of the absence (or marginality) of relational attention in their
operation. A full-blown theory of relational regulation may suggest, for
example, that fostering competition should not only be considered from a
result-oriented perspective geared to efficiency, but also from a processoriented perspective, in which competition is understood as a means to equal
opportunity that entails important elements of relational justice.238 This and
234

See supra text accompanying notes 50–51 (explaining the substantive theory of private law
earlier discussed).
235
Another potential direction may relate to the training of the pertinent personnel, although one
may assume that the recruitment and training practices of horizontal agencies—or, rather, the particular
horizontal departments of these agencies—are already adjusted to the task at hand.
236
Thus, the FTC, in addition to its mission to promote competition, is empowered to protect
consumers by defining acts or practices as unfair or deceptive. See U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N,
STRATEGIC
PLAN
FOR
FISCAL
YEARS
2014
TO
2018,
at
3,
6
(2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/2014-2018-strategic-plan/spfy14-fy18.pdf.
Likewise, the SEC is responsible for both maintaining “fair, orderly, and efficient markets” and
protecting investors. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FISCAL YEARS 2014-2018, at 3,
https://www.sec.gov/about/sec-strategic-plan-2014-2018.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2020). Another
agency that may fit this category is the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which in many ways
resembles aggregative agencies. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., STRATEGIC PRIORITIES 2014-2018, at
i (2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/UCM416602.pdf;
cf. Keating, supra note 128, at 202, 231 (discussing how the “safe-level standard” the Agency applies to
food security can hardly be justified in aggregative terms).
237
See U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FISCAL YEARS 2014 TO 2018, at 6–7
(2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/2014-2018-strategic-plan/spfy14-fy18.pdf
(noting how one possible “horizontal deficit” of both the SEC and FTC is that neither aims at resolving
individual complaints; rather, they both use complaints primarily to detect patterns of wrongdoing); How
Investigations Work, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/News/
Article/Detail/Article/1356125787012 (last modified Jan. 27, 2017) (discussing the sources from which
the SEC “obtains evidence of possible violations of the securities laws).
238
See Hanoch Dagan, Between Regulatory and Autonomy-Based Private Law, 22 EUR. L.J. 644,
644 (2016) (explaining how this may be the raison d’être of the EU principle of access justice, which
underlies a significant subset of the European regulatory private law).
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other potential reformist implications of our effort in these pages239 must
wait for another day (and maybe other authors).

239
The full reconstructive potential of a theory of private law agencies should question also the
basic structure of the regulatory apparatus. It may imply that insofar as this subset of the administrative
state is concerned, one should design the architecture of the universe of agencies based on a taxonomy
of our interpersonal relationships.
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